Well-Founded Extensive Games with Perfect Information

Krzysztof R. Apt
Sunil Simon

We consider extensive games with perfect information with well-founded game trees and study the problems of existence and of characterization of the sets of subgame perfect equilibria in these games. We also provide such characterizations for two classes of these games in which subgame perfect equilibria exist: two-player zero-sum games with, respectively, two and three outcomes.

In Joseph Halpern and Andrés Perea: Proceedings Eighteenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 2021), Beijing, China, June 25-27, 2021, Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 335, pp. 7–21.
Published: 22nd June 2021.

ArXived at: https://dx.doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.335.2 bibtex PDF
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