Game-Theoretic Models of Moral and Other-Regarding Agents (extended abstract)

Gabriel Istrate
(West University of Timisoara, Romania)

We investigate Kantian equilibria in finite normal form games, a class of non-Nashian, morally motivated courses of action that was recently proposed in the economics literature. We highlight a number of problems with such equilibria, including computational intractability, a high price of miscoordination, and problematic extension to general normal form games. We give such a generalization based on concept of program equilibria, and point out that that a practically relevant generalization may not exist. To remedy this we propose some general, intuitive, computationally tractable, other-regarding equilibria that are special cases Kantian equilibria, as well as a class of courses of action that interpolates between purely self-regarding and Kantian behavior.

In Joseph Halpern and Andrés Perea: Proceedings Eighteenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 2021), Beijing, China, June 25-27, 2021, Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 335, pp. 213–227.
This is the extended abstract that appears in the Proceedings of TARK 2021. A longer, more complete, version of the paper is available as preprint
Published: 22nd June 2021.

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