Knowledge from Probability

Jeremy Goodman
Bernhard Salow

We give a probabilistic analysis of inductive knowledge and belief and explore its predictions concerning knowledge about the future, about laws of nature, and about the values of inexactly measured quantities. The analysis combines a theory of knowledge and belief formulated in terms of relations of comparative normality with a probabilistic reduction of those relations. It predicts that only highly probable propositions are believed, and that many widely held principles of belief-revision fail.

In Joseph Halpern and Andrés Perea: Proceedings Eighteenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 2021), Beijing, China, June 25-27, 2021, Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 335, pp. 171–186.
Published: 22nd June 2021.

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