Backdoors to q-Horn

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Abstract -

The class q-Horn, introduced by Boros, Crama and Hammer in 1990, is one of the largest known classes of propositional CNF formulas for which satisfiability can be decided in polynomial time. This class properly contains the fundamental classes of Horn and Krom formulas as well as the class of renamable (or disguised) Horn formulas. In this paper we extend this class so that its favorable algorithmic properties can be made accessible to formulas that are outside but "close" to this class. We show that deciding satisfiability is fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by the distance of the given formula from q-Horn. The distance is measured by the smallest number of variables that we need to delete from the formula in order to get a q-Horn formula, i.e., the size of a smallest deletion backdoor set into the class q-Horn. This result generalizes known fixed-parameter tractability results for satisfiability decision with respect to the parameters distance from Horn, Krom, and renamable Horn.

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1 Introduction

The satisfiability problem (SAT) is a well-known fundamental problem in Computer Science [3]. Many hard combinatorial problems including problems from the domains of hardware and software verification, Artificial Intelligence, planning and scheduling can be encoded as SAT instances [2, 4, 15, 17, 23]. However, the problem is known to be NP-hard and thus we cannot hope to solve it polynomial time [7]. In spite of this, over the last two decades, SAT-solvers have become quite successful in solving formulas with hundreds of thousands of variables that encode problems arising from various application areas (see, e.g., [14]), but theoretical performance guarantees are far from explaining this empirically observed efficiency. In fact, there is an enormous gap between theory and practice.

The discrepancy between theory and practice can be potentially explained by the presence of a certain "hidden structure" in real-world problem instances. One such "hidden structure" in real-world instances of SAT is the presence of *small backdoor sets* [24]. There are three variants of backdoor sets with respect to a particular base class \mathcal{C} of polynomial-time decidable CNF formulas: strong \mathcal{C} -backdoor sets, where for each truth assignment to

the backdoor variables, the reduced formula belongs to \mathcal{C} ; deletion \mathcal{C} -backdoor sets, where deleting all backdoor variables and their negations from the formula moves the formula into the base class \mathcal{C} ; and weak backdoor sets where, for at least one truth assignment to the backdoor variables, the reduced formula belongs to \mathcal{C} and is satisfiable. Given a backdoor set of a formula with respect to a particular tractable base class \mathcal{C} , the satisfiability of the formula can be decided by guessing an assignment to the variables in the backdoor set and deciding the satisfiability of the reduced formula, which is guaranteed to be in \mathcal{C} , using a sub-solver for \mathcal{C} . An equivalent view of this is to consider the size of the backdoor set to be the "distance" of the formula from the class \mathcal{C} . The objective is to extend the favorable algorithmic properties of the class \mathcal{C} to formulas which are "close" to this class. Ideally, we would want the class \mathcal{C} to be as large as possible.

In a 1990 paper [5], Boros, Crama and Hammer introduced an interesting class of CNF formulas, later called q-Horn [6], with favorable algorithmic properties: both recognition as well as satisfiability decision of q-Horn formulas can be carried out in linear-time [5, 6]. This class q-Horn properly contains the fundamental classes of Horn and Krom formulas [22], and the class of renamable (or disguised) Horn formulas [16, 1]:

Horn \subseteq renamableHorn \subseteq q-Horn \supseteq Krom.

The fact that this class is so large serves as an additional motivation for choosing it as our base class of interest. In this paper, we study the problem of finding small backdoor sets with respect to the class of q-Horn formulas and obtain algorithmic as well as hardness results.

Contribution The main contribution of this paper is an algorithm that, given a CNF formula F of length ℓ with n variables and an integer $k \geq 0$, runs in time $O(6^k k \ell n)$, and either returns a deletion q-Horn-backdoor set for F of size at most $k^2 + k$, or concludes correctly that no such set of size at most k exists. As a consequence, we obtain that SAT is fixed-parameter tractable with the size of the smallest deletion q-Horn-backdoor set as the parameter, as we can use this algorithm to reduce the satisfiability problem of a CNF formula F of distance k from being q-Horn to testing the satsfiability of $2^{O(k^2)}$ -many q-Horn formulas. Our result simultaneously generalizes the known fixed-parameter tractability results for SAT parameterized by the deletion distance from the class of renamable Horn formulas [20] and from the class of Krom formulas [19].

At the highest level, our algorithm works by finding a bounded number of variables whose deletion results in an instance with an optimal solution strictly smaller than that of the original instance. By repeatedly computing such a set and deleting it, we obtain the approximate solution. The main technical part of the paper is the algorithm to compute the bounded set of variables with the required properties. This algorithm relies on a characterization of q-Horn formulas in terms of their quadratic cover by Boros, Hammer, and Sun [6]. We use this characterization to model the problem of finding a small deletion q-Horn-backdoor set as a problem of hitting certain types of paths in an auxiliary digraph related to the formula. Using this characterization, we show that if we are guaranteed that an optimal solution hits all paths between a carefully chosen pair of vertices in this digraph, then we can compute in polynomial time a set of variables whose size is bounded by some f(k) such that (a) there is a minimal (though not necessarily optimal) solution containing these variables and (b) deletion of these variables results in a formula whose solution is strictly smaller than the solution for the formula we started with. A standout feature of our algorithm is that at its core, it reduces to computing flows in a directed graph whose size is linear in the input size. As a result, our algorithm is quite efficient not only with respect to the dependence of the running time on the parameter, but also with respect to the dependence on the input size, along with having only a small hidden constant factor in the asymptotic running time. Finally, towards the end of the paper we also provide parameterized complexity results regarding the detection of weak and strong backdoor sets with respect to the class q-Horn.

Related Work The parameterized complexity of finding small backdoor sets was initiated by Nishimura et al. [19] who showed that for the base classes of Horn formulas and Krom formulas, the detection of strong backdoor sets is fixed-parameter tractable. Their algorithms exploit the fact that for these two base classes, strong and deletion backdoor sets coincide, and that deletion backdoor sets with respect to Horn and Krom can be characterized in terms of vertex covers and hitting sets of certain graphs and 3-uniform hypergraphs associated with the input formula, respectively. For base classes other than Horn and Krom, strong backdoor sets can be much smaller than deletion backdoor sets, and their detection is more difficult. In particular, for the base classes of renamable Horn and q-Horn, there are formulas that have a strong backdoor set of size 1 but require an arbitrarily large deletion backdoor set. In fact, Razgon and O'Sullivan [20] showed that the detection of deletion backdoor sets with respect to the base class renamable Horn is fixed-parameter tractable although the detection of strong backdoor sets is W[2]-hard [13]. For more recent results, the reader is referred to a survey on the parameterized complexity of backdoor sets [13].

2 Preliminaries

Formulas We assume an infinite supply of propositional variables. A literal is a variable x or a negated variable \bar{x} ; if y=x or $y=\bar{x}$ is a literal for some variable x, then we write \bar{y} to denote \bar{x} or x, respectively. For a set S of literals we put $\bar{S} = \{\bar{x} : x \in S\}$; S is consistent if $S \cap \overline{S} = \emptyset$. A clause is a finite consistent set of literals; we consider a clause as a disjunction of its literals. A finite set of clauses is a CNF formula (or formula, for short); we consider a formula to be the conjunction of its clauses. A formula is *Horn* if each of its clauses contains at most one positive literal, a formula is Krom (or 2CNF, or quadratic) if each clause contains at most two literals. A variable x occurs in a clause C if $x \in C \cup \overline{C}$; var(C) denotes the set of variables which occur in C. For a set X of variables, lit(X) denotes the set of literals of the variables in X, that is, $lit(X) = X \cup \bar{X}$ and for a set L of literals, var(L) denotes the set of variables whose literals are in L, that is, $var(L) = \{x : x \in L \text{ or } \bar{x} \in L\}$. A variable x occurs in a formula F if it occurs in one of its clauses, and we let $var(F) = \bigcup_{C \in F} var(C)$ and $\operatorname{lit}(F) = \operatorname{var}(F) \cup \overline{\operatorname{var}(F)}$. The length of a CNF formula F, denoted by ||F||, is defined as $\sum_{C \in F} |C|$. If F is a formula and X a set of variables, then we denote by F - X the formula obtained from F after removing all literals in lit(X) from the clauses in F. If $X = \{x\}$ we simply write F - x instead of $F - \{x\}$.

Let F be a formula and $X \subseteq \text{var}(F)$. A truth assignment is a mapping $\tau: X \to \{0,1\}$ defined on some set X of variables; we write $\text{var}(\tau) = X$. For $x \in \text{var}(\tau)$ we define $\tau(\bar{x}) = 1 - \tau(x)$. For a truth assignment τ and a formula F, we define $F[\tau] = \{C \setminus \tau^{-1}(0) : C \in F, C \cap \tau^{-1}(1) = \emptyset\}$, i.e., $F[\tau]$ denotes the result of instantiating variables according to τ and applying the usual simplifications, i.e., removing clauses that are satisfied by τ and removing unsatisfied literals from clauses. A truth assignment τ satisfies a clause C if C contains some literal x with $\tau(x) = 1$; τ satisfies a formula F if it satisfies all clauses of F. A formula is satisfiable if it is satisfied by some truth assignment; otherwise it is unsatisfiable.

The Satisfiability (SAT) problem asks whether a given CNF formula is satisfiable.

Parameterized Complexity An instance of a parameterized problem is a pair (I, k) where I

is the main part and k is the parameter; the latter is usually a non-negative integer. A parameterized problem is fixed-parameter tractable if there exist a computable function f and a constant c such that instances (I, k) can be solved in time $O(f(k)||I||^c)$ where ||I|| denotes the size of I. FPT is the class of all fixed-parameter tractable decision problems and algorithms which run in the time specified above are called FPT algorithms.

An FPT-reduction is a many-one reduction where the parameter for one problem maps into the parameter for the other. More specifically, given two parameterized decision problems L and L', problem L reduces to problem L' if there is a mapping R from instances of L to instances of L' such that (i) (I,k) is a yes-instance of L if and only if (I',k')=R(I,k) is a yes-instance of L', (ii) $k' \leq g(k)$ for a computable function g, and (iii) R can be computed in time $O(f(k)||I||^c)$ where f is a computable function and c is a constant.

The Weft Hierarchy consists of parameterized complexity classes W[1] \subseteq W[2] \subseteq · · · which are defined as the closure of certain parameterized problems under FPT-reductions (see [9, 11] for definitions). There is strong theoretical evidence that parameterized problems that are hard for classes W[i] are not fixed-parameter tractable. For example FPT = W[1] implies that the Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH) fails; that is, FPT = W[1] implies the existence of a $2^{o(n)}$ algorithm for n-variable 3SAT [11].

An FPT-approximation algorithm with ratio ρ for a minimization problem P is an FPT algorithm that, given an instance x of P and a positive integer k, either determines that there is no solution of size at most k or computes a solution of size at most $k\rho(k)$ (see, e.g., [10]). The definition can be adapted to maximization problems. Note that the approximation ratio ρ is a function of k and not the input size: intuitively, if k is small, then $k\rho(k)$ can be still considered small. We say that a problem is FPT-approximable if it has an FPT-approximation algorithm for some function ρ .

Backdoors Here, we introduce the basic terminology for backdoors and the class of q-Horn formulas. For further information on backdoors and other tractable base classes of SATIS-FIABILITY we refer the reader to [13].

Backdoors are defined with respect to a fixed class \mathcal{C} of CNF formulas, the base class (or target class, or more figuratively, island of tractability). We say a class \mathcal{C} of formulas is clause-induced if it is closed under subsets, i.e., if $F \in \mathcal{C}$ implies $F' \in \mathcal{C}$ for each $F' \subseteq F$.

A strong C-backdoor set of a CNF formula F is a set B of variables such that $F[\tau] \in \mathcal{C}$ for each assignment $\tau: B \to \{0,1\}$. A weak C-backdoor set of F is a set B of variables such that $F[\tau]$ is satisfiable and $F[\tau] \in \mathcal{C}$ holds for some assignment $\tau: B \to \{0,1\}$. A deletion C-backdoor set of F is a set B of variables such that $F - B \in \mathcal{C}$. Backdoor sets where independently introduced by Crama et al. [8] and by Williams et al. [24], the latter authors coined the term "backdoor".


If we know a strong \mathcal{C} -backdoor set of F of size k, we can reduce the satisfiability of F to the satisfiability of 2^k formulas in \mathcal{C} . Thus SAT becomes fixed-parameter tractable with k as the parameter. If we know a weak \mathcal{C} -backdoor set of F, then F is clearly satisfiable, and we can verify it by trying for each $\tau \in 2^k$ whether $F[\tau]$ is in \mathcal{C} and satisfiable. If \mathcal{C} is clause-induced, every deletion \mathcal{C} -backdoor set of F is a strong \mathcal{C} -backdoor set of F. For several base classes, deletion backdoor sets are of interest because they are easier to detect than strong backdoor sets. The challenging problem is to find a strong, weak, or deletion \mathcal{C} -backdoor set of size at most k if it exists. For each class \mathcal{C} of CNF formulas, the various backdoor detection problems are defined as follows.

Deletion C-Backdoor Set Detection

Parameter: k

Input: A CNF formula F and a positive integer k

Question: Does F have a deletion C-backdoor set of size at most k?



q-Horn Formulas In this paper we are mainly interested in the class of q-Horn formulas [5, 6]. A CNF formula F is in this class if there is a *certifying function* β : $\operatorname{var}(F) \cup \overline{\operatorname{var}(F)} \to \{0, \frac{1}{2}, 1\}$ with $\beta(x) = 1 - \beta(\bar{x})$ for every $x \in \operatorname{var}(F)$ such that $\sum_{l \in C} \beta(l) \leq 1$ for every clause C of F.

In the following sense, strong q-Horn-backdoor sets are more general than deletion q-Horn-backdoor sets: For every positive integer n there is a formula F_n such that F_n has a strong q-Horn-backdoor set of size 1 but every deletion q-Horn-backdoor set of F has size at least n. To see this, take for instance $F = \bigcup_{1 \leq i \leq n} \{\{x_i, y_i, z_i, a\}, \{\bar{x}_i, \bar{y}_i, \bar{z}_i, \bar{a}\}\}$. Evidently, $\{a\}$ is a strong q-Horn-backdoor set of F. However, every deletion q-Horn-backdoor set of F must contain at least one variable $x_i, y_i, \text{ or } z_i \text{ for every } 1 \leq i \leq n$.

FPT-approximation for Deletion q-Horn Backdoor Set Detection

In this section we prove our main result:

▶ Theorem 1. There is an algorithm that, given an instance (F,k) of Deletion q-Horn Backdoor Set Detection, runs in time $O(6^kk\ell n)$ and either correctly concludes that F has no deletion q-Horn-backdoor set of size at most k or returns a deletion q-Horn-backdoor set of F of size at most $k^2 + k$, where ℓ is the length of F and n is the number of variables in F.

3.1 Quadratic covers, implication graphs and separators

In this subsection we give some definitions regarding quadratic covers, implication graphs and separators in implication graphs, which will be required for the description of our algorithm. The following definition of the quadratic cover of a CNF formula was used Boros et al. [6] to give a linear time algorithm to recognize q-Horn formulas.

▶ **Definition 2.** Given a CNF formula F, the **quadratic cover** of F, is a Krom formula denoted by F_2 and is defined as follows. Let x_1, \ldots, x_n be the variables of F. For every clause C, we have |C|-1 new variables $y_1^C, \ldots, y_{|C|-1}^C$. We order the literals in each clause according to their variables, that is, a literal of x_i will occur before a literal of x_j if i < j. Let $l_1^C, \ldots, l_{|C|}^C$ be the literals of the clause C in this order. The quadratic cover is defined as

$$F_2 = \bigcup_{C \in F} \bigcup_{1 \leq i \leq |C|-1} \{ \{l_i^C, y_i^C\}, \{\bar{y}_i^C, l_{i+1}^C\} \} \quad \cup \quad \bigcup_{C \in F} \bigcup_{1 \leq i \leq |C|-2} \{ \{\bar{y}_i^C, y_{i+1}^C\} \}.$$

▶ **Definition 3.** Given a CNF formula F, the **implication graph** of F_2 is denoted by $D(F_2)$ and defined as follows. The vertex set of the graph is the set of literals of F_2 and for every clause $\{l_1, l_2\}$ in F_2 , we have arcs (\bar{l}_1, l_2) and (\bar{l}_2, l_1) . We refer to the vertices of the implication graph as literals since there is a one to one correspondence between the two. Given a set $X \subseteq var(F)$ of variables, we define the graph $D(F_2) - X$ as the graph obtained from $D(F_2)$ by deleting Iit(X).

The following observations are direct consequences of the definition of an implication graph.

- ▶ Observation 1. Let F be a CNF formula of length ℓ .
- (a) If there is a path from l_1 to l_2 in $D(F_2)$, then there is also a path from \bar{l}_2 to \bar{l}_1 in $D(F_2)$.
- **(b)** The number of arcs in $D(F_2)$ is $O(\ell)$.
- (c) Let $C = \{l_1, \ldots, l_r\}$ be a clause of F. Then, for any $1 \le i < j \le r$, $D(F_2)$ contains a path from \bar{l}_i to l_j and from \bar{l}_j to l_i whose internal vertices are all disjoint from lit(F).

- (d) Let $X \subseteq var(F)$ and F' = F X. Then, for any literal $l \in lit(F) \setminus lit(X)$, there is a path from l to \bar{l} in $D(F'_2)$ if and only if there is a path from l to \bar{l} in $D(F_2) X$.
- ▶ **Definition 4.** Given a CNF formula F and a set L of literals of F, we denote by $N_F^+(L)$ the set of literals in $lit(F) \setminus L$ which can be reached from L in $D(F_2)$ via a path whose internal vertices are disjoint from lit(F).
- ▶ **Definition 5.** ([6]) Given a CNF formula F, define a **canonical function** $\hat{\beta}$: lit(F) \rightarrow {0, $\frac{1}{2}$, 1} as follows. Consider a topological ordering π of the strongly connected components of D(F_2). For every literal $l \in \text{lit}(F)$ such that the strongly connected component containing l appears before the one containing \bar{l} in π , set $\hat{\beta}(l) = 1$ and for every literal l such that the strongly connected component containing l also contains \bar{l} , set $\hat{\beta}(l) = \frac{1}{2}$.
- ▶ **Lemma 6.** ([6]) A CNF formula F is q-Horn if and only if the function $\hat{\beta}$ defined above is a certifying function for F.
- ▶ **Definition 7.** A clause C of a given CNF formula is called a **violating clause** if $\sum_{l \in C} \hat{\beta}(l) > 1$. Any three literals l_1, l_2, l_3 of a violating clause such that $\sum_{i=1}^{3} \hat{\beta}(l_i) > 1$ form a **violating triple**.
- ▶ Lemma 8. Let F be a CNF formula of length ℓ and suppose that F is not a q-Horn formula. Any violating clause of F has a violating triple lying entirely inside a strongly connected component of $D(F_2)$ and we can compute such a violating triple in time $O(\ell)$.

Because of space constraints we omit the easy proof of this lemma.

We now move on to some definitions on separators in implication graphs which will be required in the description of our algorithm.

- ▶ **Definition 9.** Let F be a CNF formula and $L \subseteq \text{lit}(F)$ be a consistent set of literals. We say that a set $J \subseteq \text{lit}(F)$ is an L- \bar{L} separator if J is disjoint from L and \bar{L} and there is no path from L to \bar{L} in the graph $D(F_2)-J$. We say that J is a minimal L- \bar{L} separator if no proper subset of J is an L- \bar{L} separator.
- ▶ **Definition 10.** Let F be a CNF formula, $L \subseteq \mathrm{lit}(F)$ be a consistent set of literals and let X be a set of variables of F. We call X an L- \bar{L} variable separator if $\mathrm{lit}(X)$ is an L- \bar{L} variable separator. We call X a minimal L- \bar{L} variable separator if no proper subset of X is an L- \bar{L} variable separator. We drop the word variable if it is clear from the context that the set we are dealing with is a set of variables.
- ▶ **Definition 11.** Let F be a CNF formula, $L \subseteq \text{lit}(F)$ be a consistent set of literals and X be an L- \bar{L} variable separator. We denote by R(L,X) the set of literals of F that can be reached from L via directed paths in $D(F_2)-X$, and we denote by $\bar{R}(L,X)$ the set of literals of F which have a directed path to L in $D(F_2)-X$.

We also require the following observation.

▶ Observation 2. Let F be a CNF formula, $L \subseteq \text{lit}(F)$ be a consistent set of literals and X be an L- \bar{L} variable separator. Then, the sets R(L,X) and $\bar{R}(\bar{L},X)$ are also consistent and in fact complements of each other.

3.2 The algorithm

We begin with the following simple lemma.

- ▶ Lemma 12. Let (F,k) be an instance of Deletion q-Horn Backdoor Set Detection. Let (l_1,l_2,l_3) be a violating triple in a strongly connected component of $D(F_2)$ and X be a solution for the given instance disjoint from $\{var(l_1), var(l_2), var(l_3)\}$. Then, for some $1 \le i \le 3$, X is an l_i - \bar{l}_i separator in $D(F_2)$.
- **Proof.** Let $\hat{\beta}'$ be the canonical certifying function for F' = F X obtained from the graph $D(F_2')$. We claim that there is an $1 \leq i \leq 3$ such that $\hat{\beta}'(l_i) = 0$. This is true since F' contains a clause with all three literals l_1 , l_2 and l_3 and it cannot be the case that any certifying function sets non zero values to all three. By definition of $\hat{\beta}'$, $\hat{\beta}'(l_i) = 0$ implies that there is no path from l_i to \bar{l}_i in the graph $D(F_2')$. If X were not an l_i - \bar{l}_i separator in $D(F_2)$, then $D(F_2')$ would also contain an l_i - \bar{l}_i path (by Observation 1(d)), a contradiction. This completes the proof of the lemma.

Lemma 8 combined with Lemma 12 allows us to compute in linear time, a set of three literals such that for every solution X one of the three corresponding variables is part of X or for at least one of these literals, say l, there is a path from l to \bar{l} in $D(F_2)$ and X an l- \bar{l} variable separator in $D(F_2)$.

- ▶ Lemma 13. Let (F,k) be an instance of Deletion q-Horn Backdoor Set Detection and X be a solution such that it is disjoint from var(l) and is an $l-\bar{l}$ separator for some literal $l \in lit(F)$. Consider an $l-\bar{l}$ variable separator X'. Let X'' be the set of variables of X with a literal in R(l,X'). Then, the set $\tilde{X} = (X \setminus X'') \cup X'$ is also a deletion q-Horn-backdoor set for the given instance.
- **Proof.** Let F' = F X and $\tilde{F} = F \tilde{X}$. If \tilde{X} were not a deletion q-Horn-backdoor set, then there is a violating clause in \tilde{F} and by Lemma 8, there is a violating triple (l_1, l_2, l_3) in a strongly connected component of $D(\tilde{F}_2)$. This implies the presence of a closed walk in $D(\tilde{F}_2)$ containing all the literals of the violating triple and their complements (by Lemma 8). Since X was a solution, this closed walk could not have survived in $D(F'_2)$ and hence must contain a literal of a variable in $X \setminus \tilde{X}$. Recall that the only variables of X that are not in \tilde{X} are those in X''. Let p be a literal on this closed walk which corresponds to such a variable, that is, $var(p) \in X''$. On the other hand, by definition, the literals of the variables in X'' can either reach \bar{l} or be reached from l in $D(\tilde{F}_2)$, that is, they must lie in $R(l, \tilde{X})$ or $\bar{R}(\bar{l}, \tilde{X})$. Combining this path along with the closed walk and the fact that $D(\tilde{F}_2)$ is an implication graph implies the presence of a path from l to \bar{l} in $D(\tilde{F}_2)$. However, by construction, \tilde{X} is also an l- \bar{l} separator in $D(F_2)$. Observation $D(\bar{r})$ implies that this is a contradiction. This completes the proof of the lemma.
- **Proof.** We show that Algorithm 3.1 has the stated properties. The algorithm computes an l- \bar{l} variable separator X' which essentially maximizes the set of literals of $D(F_2)$ reachable from l after removing X'. We will then show that such a separator indeed has the required properties.

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Input: A tuple (F, k, l) where F is a CNF formula, k a positive integer and l a literal of F Output: No provided that D(F_2) has no l \cdot \overline{l} variable separator of size at most k, or an l \cdot \overline{l} variable separator S of size at most 2k such that (S \cup \text{var}(R(l,S))) has non-empty intersection with some minimum deletion q-Horn-backdoor set

1 if there is an l \cdot \overline{l} separator of size at most 2k in D(F_2) then

2 |S \leftarrow \text{such a separator}|S \leftarrow \text{such a sep
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Algorithm 3.1: Algorithm COMPUTE-SEPARATOR

If it the algorithm returns No in Line 4, then $D(F_2)$ has no $l - \bar{l}$ variable separator of size at most k. Let S be the minimal separator in $D(F_2)$ which was computed in the penultimate iteration of the while loop. We claim that X' = var(S) satisfies the conditions in the statement of the lemma. Clearly, it must be the case that for some choice of a literal l' in $\text{lit}(\text{var}(S)) \cap N_F^+(L)$, the next iteration of the loop could not find an $L \cup \{l'\} - \bar{L} \cup \{\bar{l'}\}$ separator of size at most 2k.

Suppose that $(X' \cup \operatorname{var}(R(l,X'))) \cap X$ is empty. Recall that when the procedure stops, L = R(l,X'). Furthermore, if there is at least one path from l to \bar{l} in $D(F_2)$ then it must be the case that $\operatorname{lit}(\operatorname{var}(S)) \cap N_F^+(L)$ is non-empty. Since X is an l- \bar{l} separator and disjoint from L, X is also an L- \bar{L} separator. Since X is also disjoint from X', for any $l' \in \operatorname{lit}(\operatorname{var}(S)) \cap N_F^+(L)$, X intersects all paths from $L \cup \{l'\}$ to $\bar{L} \cup \{\bar{l'}\}$. Hence, $\operatorname{lit}(X)$ is a set of size at most 2k which intersects all $L \cup \{l'\}$ - $\bar{L} \cup \{\bar{l'}\}$ paths, which is a contradiction. Therefore, the set $(X' \cup \operatorname{var}(R(l,X'))) \cap X$ is non-empty for any l- \bar{l} variable separator X of size at most k.

To bound the running time, observe that in each iteration, we only need to test if there is an L- \bar{L} separator of size at most 2k. Hence, it suffices for us to run the Ford-Fulkerson algorithm [12] for at most 2k steps on the graph $D(F_2)$ and the number of iterations is bounded by the number of variables in the formula since in each iteration, we add a literal to L. Since the number of arcs in $D(F_2)$ is $O(\ell)$ (Observation 1(b)), the claimed time bound follows. This completes the proof of the lemma.

▶ Lemma 15. Let (F,k) be an instance of DELETION q-Horn BACKDOOR SET DETECTION and let l be a literal of F disjoint from a solution X and suppose that X is an l- \overline{l} variable separator in $D(F_2)$. Consider an l- \overline{l} variable separator in $D(F_2)$, X', such that $(X' \cup var(R(l,X'))) \cap X$ is non-empty. Then, the instance F-X' has a deletion q-Horn-backdoor set of size at most |X|-1.

Proof. By Lemma 13, we know that the set $\hat{X} = (X \setminus X'') \cup X'$ is a deletion q-Horn-backdoor set. Hence, $X \setminus (X'' \cup X')$ is indeed a deletion q-Horn-backdoor set for the instance F - X'. Since $(X' \cup X'') \cap X$ is non-empty, the size of $X \setminus (X'' \cup X')$ is at most |X| - 1. This completes the proof of the lemma.

```
Input: A CNF formula F of length \ell with n variables, integer k
   Output: Either no solution of size at most k or a solution of size at most k^2 + k for the
             instance (F, k) of Deletion q-Horn Backdoor Set Detection
1 if k < 0 then return No
 2 check for a violating clause by computing D(F_2) and a topological ordering of D(F_2)
3 if there is no violating clause then return \emptyset
4 Compute a violating triple (l_1, l_2, l_3)
5 for l = l_1, l_2, l_3 do
       S_1 \leftarrow \text{DELETION-QHORN-BSD}(F - \{var(l)\}, k - 1)
       if S_1 is not No then return S_1 \cup \{var(l)\}
8 end
9 for l = l_1, l_2, l_3 do
10
       S \leftarrow \text{COMPUTE-SEPARATOR}(F, k, l)
       if S is No then return No else
11
        S_1 \leftarrow \text{DELETION-QHORN-BSD}(F - \{S\}, k-1)
12
13
       end
       if S_1 is not No then return S_1 \cup \{S\}
14
15 end
16 return No
```

Algorithm 3.2: Algorithm DELETION-QHORN-BSD

Lemmas 14 and 15 allow us to compute a bounded set of variables whose deletion from the formula results in an instance that has a solution which is strictly smaller than any solution of the input instance. This completes the formalization of our ideas and we are now ready to prove Theorem 1 by describing our algorithm for DELETION q-Horn BACKDOOR SET DETECTION.

Description of the Algorithm Algorithm 3.2 checks whether there is a violating triple and if so, computes one and in the first 3 branches, it adds the variable corresponding to each of the literals of the violating triple to the solution, deletes it from the formula and recurses on the resulting instance with a budget of k-1. In each of the next 3 branches, it picks a literal of the violating triple and continues by assuming that this literal is assigned 0 by a certifying function of F-X where X is a solution. We know that there must be at least one such literal (see the proof of Lemma 12) in the violating triple. This implies that X is an l- \bar{l} separator for the literal l in the violating triple which is assigned 0 by a certifying function of F-X. Finally, Lemma 14 is used to either conclude that there is no l- \bar{l} variable separator of size at most k in which case the algorithm returns No, or to compute an l- \bar{l} variable separator of size at most 2k with the required properties. The variables in X' are added to our proposed approximate solution and deleted from the formula, and the algorithm recurses on the resulting instance with a budget of k-1.

Analysis Since Steps 2, 4, and 10 at any node of the search tree take time $O(k\ell n)$ and we have a 6-way branching at each node of the search tree with the budget k dropping by 1 in each branch, the algorithm clearly runs in the claimed time bound. Therefore, it only remains for us to prove the correctness of the algorithm. Let X be a solution for the given instance and let β be a certifying function for F - X. We prove the correctness of the algorithm by induction on k.

In the base case, when k=0, the algorithm is correct by Lemma 6. We assume as induction hypothesis that the algorithm is correct for all values of k up to some k'-1 where

k'-1>0. We now consider the case when k=k'.

In Lines 5–8, we consider the case when X intersects the set $\{var(l_1), var(l_2), var(l_3)\}$ and branch accordingly. Applying the induction hypothesis, the size of any returned solution in a subsequent recursive call is at most $(k-1)^2 + (k-1)$. Hence, the size of a solution returned here is bounded by $1 + (k-1)^2 + (k-1) \le k^2 + k$.

In Lines 9–15, we consider the case when X is disjoint from the set of variables corresponding to l_1, l_2 and l_3 . Since l_1, l_2, l_3 lie in the same clause and none of their corresponding variables are in X, by Lemma 12, X is an l_i - \bar{l}_i separator for at least one of the literals l_i . Let us assume that this literal is l_1 . In Line 10, we apply Lemma 14 to compute an l_1 - \bar{l}_1 separator S of size at most 2k and add it to the solution we are constructing. By Lemma 15, we know that there is a solution for the instance F-S of size at most |X|-1. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, we obtain a solution of size at most $(k-1)^2 + (k-1)$ from the subsequent recursive call and adding to it the set S of size at most 2k results in a solution of size at most $k^2 + k$, which proves the correctness of the algorithm, completing the proof of Theorem 1.

In order to test the satisfiability of a given CNF formula F, it suffices to first compute a smallest deletion q-Horn-backdoor set of F and for each assignment to this set, test the satisfiability of the reduced formula which is q-Horn. Since testing satisfiability of a q-Horn formula is linear time [5], Theorem 1 has the following corollary.

▶ Corollary 16. There is an algorithm that, given a formula F of length ℓ with n variables, runs in time $2^{O(k^2)}\ell n$ and decides the satisfiability of F, where k is the size of the smallest deletion q-Horn-backdoor set of F.

4 Hardness

In this section we show that there is no FPT algorithm for STRONG q-Horn-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION or WEAK q-Horn-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION unless FPT=W[2]. In order to show this, we begin from the following problem, which is well-known to be W[2]-complete [9].

HITTING SET Parameter: k

Input: A set E of elements, a family S of finite subsets of E, and an integer k > 0. **Question:** Does S have a hitting set, i.e., a subset E of E such that E of every E of size at most E?

▶ Theorem 17. Strong q-Horn-Backdoor Set Detection is W[2]-hard.

Proof. We prove the theorem via an FPT-reduction from HITTING SET. Let (E, \mathcal{S}, k) be an instance of HITTING SET. We construct a formula F that has a strong q-Horn-backdoor set of size at most k if and only if \mathcal{S} has a hitting set of size at most k. The formula F has two clauses $P_S^i = S \cup \{x_i, y_i, z_i\}$ and $N_S^i = \bar{E} \cup \{\bar{x}_i, \bar{y}_i, \bar{z}_i\}$ for every $S \in \mathcal{S}$ and $1 \leq i \leq k+1$. Note that $\text{var}(F) = E \cup \{x_i, y_i, z_i : 1 \leq i \leq k+1\}$. Furthermore, for any S and for any $1 \leq i \leq k+1$, the formula comprising the two clauses P_S^i and N_S^i is clearly not q-Horn. It is not hard to verify that S has a hitting set of size at most k if and only if F has a strong q-Horn-backdoor set of size at most k.

▶ Theorem 18. Weak q-Horn-backdoor Set Detection is W[2]-hard, even for 3-CNF formulas.

Proof. We prove the theorem via an FPT-reduction from HITTING SET. Let (E, \mathcal{S}, k) be an instance of HITTING SET. We construct a 3-CNF formula F that has a weak q-Horn-backdoor set of size at most k if and only if \mathcal{S} has a hitting set of size at most k. For every $S \in \mathcal{S}$ with $S = \{s_1, \ldots, s_{|S|}\}$, every $1 \leq i \leq |S|$, and every $1 \leq j \leq k+1$ the formula F contains the clauses $\{z_i^j(S), \bar{s}_i, \bar{z}_{i+1}^j(S)\}$, $\{\bar{z}_1^j(S), z_{|S|+1}^j(S)\}$, $\{\bar{z}_1^j(S), z_{|S|+1}^j(S)\}$, $\{z_1^j(S), z_{|S|+1}^j(S)\}$, $\{z_1^j(S), z_{|S|+1}^j(S)\}$, $\{z_1^j(S), z_{|S|+1}^j(S)\}$, $\{z_1^j(S), z_{|S|+1}^j(S)\}$, and $\{\bar{a}^j(S), \bar{b}^j(S)\}$. Note that $\mathrm{var}(F) = E \cup \{z_i^j(S): S \in \mathcal{S} \text{ and } 1 \leq i \leq |S|+1 \text{ and } 1 \leq j \leq k+1\} \cup \{a^j(S), b^j(S): S \in \mathcal{S} \text{ and } 1 \leq j \leq k+1\}$. Note furthermore that F is satisfiable by the assignment τ_{SAT} that sets the variables in $\{z_{|S|+1}^j(S), a^j(S): S \in \mathcal{S} \text{ and } 1 \leq j \leq k+1\}$ to 1 and all other variables to 0. It is not hard to verify that \mathcal{S} has a hitting set of size at most k if and only if F has a weak q-Horn-backdoor set of size at most k.

It remains an open problem whether STRONG q-Horn-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION or WEAK q-Horn-BACKDOOR SET DETECTION are FPT-approximable. However we note that since the reductions used in the above theorems are parameter preserving, an FPT-approximation algorithm for either of these problems would imply the existence of an FPT-approximation algorithm for HITTING SET, which is an open problem [18].

5 Conclusions

In this paper we have developed an FPT-approximation algorithm for the detection of deletion q-Horn-backdoor sets (Theorem 1). This renders SAT, parameterized by the *deletion distance* from the class of q-Horn-formulas (i.e., the size of a smallest deletion q-Horn-backdoor set) fixed-parameter tractable (Corollary 16). Our result simultaneously generalizes the known fixed-parameter tractability results for SAT parameterized by the deletion distance from the class of renamable Horn formulas [20] and from the class of Krom formulas [19]. We would like to point out that our FPT-approximation algorithm is quite efficient, and its asymptotic running time does not include large hidden factors.

The deletion distance from q-Horn is incomparable with parameters for SAT based on width measures such as the treewidth of the formula's primal, dual, or incidence graph [21]. This can be easily verified, since one can define q-Horn formulas where all of these width parameters are arbitrarily large. Conversely, by adding to a formula variable-disjoint copies of itself, we can make the deletion distance from q-Horn arbitrarily large, the width however does not increase.

There are several interesting research questions that arise from our paper. First, it would be interesting whether our algorithm can be strengthened to an exact FPT-algorithm for the detection of deletion q-Horn-backdoor sets. It would also be interesting, whether the W[2]-hardness of the detection of strong q-Horn-backdoor sets (Theorem 17) also holds if the input formula is in 3CNF. Finally, our hardness results contribute additional attention and significance to the problem of whether the parameterized HITTING SET problem has an FPT-approximation algorithm [18].

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