Journal Publications
P. Lederer. Bivariate scoring rules: Unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule. Jounal of Economic Theory, 2024. Forthcoming. [ link | pdf ]
F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen. Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes. Social Choice and Welfare, 2024. Forthcoming. [ link | pdf ]
F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and W. Suksompong. Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences. Games and Economic Behavior, 142:266-291, 2023. [ link | pdf ]
F. Brandt and P. Lederer. Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness. Theoretical Economics, 18(2):837-883, 2023. [ link | pdf]
F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and P. Lederer. On the indecisiveness of Kelly-strategyproof social choice functions. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 73:1093-1130, 2022. [ link | pdf ]
Conference Publications
P. Lederer, D. Peters, and T. Wąs. The squared Kemeny rule for averaging rankings. 2023. In Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. Forthcoming. [ pdf ]
M. Bullinger, C. Dong, P. Lederer, and C. Mehler. Participation incentives in approval-based committee elections. In Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 9546-9554. 2024. [ link | pdf ]
C. Dong and P. Lederer. Refined characterizations of approval-based committee scoring rules. In Proceedings of the 38th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2024, pages 9670-9678. [ link | pdf ]
C. Dong and P. Lederer. Characterizations of sequential valuation rules. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1697-1705, 2023. [ link | pdf ]
T. Delemazure, T. Demeulemeester, M. Eberl, J. Israel, and P. Lederer. Strategyproofness and proportionality in party-approval multiwinner elections. In Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pages 5591-5599, 2023. [ link | pdf ]
F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and S. Tausch. Strategyproof social decision schemes on super Condorcet domains. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1734-1742, 2023. [ link | pdf ]
T. Delemazure, T. Demeulemeester, M. Eberl, J. Israel, and P. Lederer. The incompatibility of strategy-proofness and representation in party-approval multi-winner elections. Archive of Formal Proofs, 2022. [ link ]
F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and W. Suksompong. Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences. In Proceedings of the 31st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 130-136, 2022. [ link | pdf ]
F. Brandt, P. Lederer, and R. Romen. Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes. In Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 181-189, 2022. [ link | pdf ]
P. Lederer. Strategyproof randomized social choice for restricted sets of utility functions. In Proceedings of the 30th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), pages 306-312, 2021. [ link | pdf ]
P. Lederer. Non-manipulability in set-valued and probabilistic social choice theory (doctoral consortium). In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 1823-1825, 2021. [ link | pdf ]
F. Brandt, M. Bullinger, and P. Lederer. On the indecisiveness of Kelly-strategyproof social choice functions. In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), pages 251-259, 2021. [ link | pdf ]