## Fair Course Allocation with Additive Utilities and a Conflict Graph

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
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
#### Motivation: a problem all universities face


- Students want to take different courses
- Not enough seats in courses
- Some courses conflict with others
- How to allocate seats "fairly"?
- How it is now: whoever get online first
- Enrollment in CS courses has gone up significantly in recent years, for example





# Problem setup, before we formally define fairness notions















#### Student i's allocation: $A_i$



What is "fair"?

What is "fair"? 1) envy-freeness

\*Gamow, George; Stern, Marvin (1958). Puzzle-math. Viking Press. ISBN 0670583359.

## What is "fair"? 1) envy-freeness\*

What is "fair"?

1) envy-freeness
 2) Max-min objective



#### when no student envies another student's allocation


For all students  $i \in \mathcal{N}$ , there does not exist a student  $i' \in$  $\mathcal{N}$ such that  $u_i(A_{i'}) > u_i(A_i)$ 

<u>**Recall</u>:**  $u_i(A_{i'})$  is the utility of student *i* for  $A_{i'}$ </u>



















#### No envy! Because of their preferences






#### But envy-freeness is a bit strict...





#### Envy-freeness, but relaxed:

#### envy-freeness up to any good (EFX)


For all students  $i \in \mathcal{N}$ , if there is a student  $i' \in \mathcal{N}$  such that  $u_i(A_{i'}) > u_i(A_i)$ , for any course  $x \in A_{i'}$  it is true that  $u_i(A_{i'} \setminus x) \leq u_i(A_i)$ 








spinach>carrot>Ø




#### Max-min fairness

an allocation of courses to students  $\mathcal{A} =$  $(A_1, \ldots, A_n)$  is max-min fair if it maximizes the minimum utility of any student. Namely, we seek to satisfy the following objective:  $\max_{A} \left( \min_{i \in \mathcal{N}} (u_i(A_i)) \right)$ 



#### Not very fair!!




Fairer!

<u>Uniform</u> means  $\forall i \in N, j \in M, u_i(j) = 1$ 1 <u>Binary</u> means  $\forall i \in N, j \in M, u_i(j) \in M$ 

# **<u>Identical</u>** means $j \in M, u_i(j) = u_{i'}(j) \forall i, i' \in N$

 $\{0,1\}$ 

**Additive** means a student's utility for a set S of items is the sum of his utilities for each item in the maximum weighted independent set of S: set:  $u_i(S) = \sum_{j \in MWIS_i(S)} u_i(j)$ 



# utility


<u>Uniform</u> means  $\forall i \in N, j \in M, u_i(j) =$ 

**<u>Binary</u>** means  $\forall i \in N, j \in M, u_i(j) \in$ 

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 $\{0,1\}$ 

#### In previous work: Arpita Biswas, Yiduo Ke, Samir Khuller, and Quanquan C. Liu. An algorithmic approach to address course enrollment challenges. In Kunal Talwar, editor, 4th Symp. on Foundations of Responsible Computing, FORC 2023



## **<u>Identical</u>** means $j \in M, u_i(j) = u_{i'}(j) \forall i, i' \in N$

This talk. EFX and 1/2 max-min

**Additive** means a student's utility for a set S of items is the sum of his utilities for each item in the maximum weighted independent set of S: set:  $u_i(S) = \sum_{j \in MWIS_i(S)} u_i(j)$ 


### One more thing about envy...

Due to courses having conflicts with each other, it is not always possible to allocate every course seat to a student



## The Charity

#### The set of all unallocated courses



## The Charity

#### No student shall envy the Charity.


#### $u_i(A_i) \ge u_i(\text{Charity}) \ \forall i \in N$



## The Charity

### No student shall envy the Charity.

#### $u_1$ (Charity) = $MWIS_1$ (Charity)



### Theorem

#### Under identical additive utility for n students, there exists an EFX and ½approx. with additive factor maxmin allocation

## EFX algorithm

#### Exists for monotonic non-decreasing utility

## EFX algorithm


#### Exists for monotonic non-decreasing utility\*

\*Chaudhury et. al. A Little Charity Guarantees Almost Envy-Freeness SODA 2020


# Our algorithm, roughly


•Find the n-largest colorable subgraph G' of the interval graph that describes the course conflicts • Find an EFX allocation on G' Continue finding an EFX allocation on the whole graph, G


## An example





## An example













Now, find an EFX allocation on the whole graph G

### An example



Now, find an EFX allocation on the whole graph G

### An example




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## Proof Sketch

- Allocation is EFX throughout the algorithm
- Optimal maxmin value OPT ≤ T/n, where T is the sum of utilities of courses in the largest n-colorable subgraph G'
  Lowest student in G' has a better allocation than the MWIS of G' ∩ Charity

## Proof Sketch



### **Related works**

- Fair Allocation with Interval Scheduling Constraints. (Li et. al. 2021, NeurIPS)
- Fair packing of independent sets. (Chiarelli et. al. 2020)
- Fair allocation of conflicting items. (Hummel and Hetland, 2021)
- Fair allocation of indivisible goods: Improvements and generalizations. (Ghodsi et. al. 2018)

#### Future work?

• Max-min approximation without finding largest - colorable subgraph Multiple meeting days for each class Different credit counts for each course •Other utility types such as non-identical, submodular, subadditive, etc.

### Thank you for attending!