References

  1. Jose M. Alonso & Gracian Trivino (2017): An Essay on Self-explanatory Computational Intelligence: A Linguistic Model of Data Processing Systems. In: Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on Explainable Computational Intelligence (XCI 2017), doi:10.18653/v1/W17-3704.
  2. Leila Amgoud & Henri Prade (2009): Using arguments for making and explaining decisions. Artificial Intelligence 173(3), pp. 413–436, doi:10.1016/j.artint.2008.11.006.
  3. Michael Anderson & Susan Leigh Anderson (2011): Machine Ethics. Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/CBO9780511978036.
  4. Gertrude E. M. Anscombe (1958): Modern Moral Philosophy. Philosophy 33(124), pp. 1–19, doi:10.1017/S0031819100037943.
  5. Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics.
  6. Gilles Barthe, Pedro R. DArgenio, Bernd Finkbeiner & Holger Hermanns (2016): Facets of software doping. In: International Symposium on Leveraging Applications of Formal Methods. Springer, pp. 601–608, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-47169-3_46.
  7. Kevin Baum (2016): What the Hack Is Wrong with Software Doping?. In: International Symposium on Leveraging Applications of Formal Methods. Springer, pp. 633–647, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-47169-3_49.
  8. Kevin Baum, Holger Hermanns & Timo Speith (2018): From Machine Ethics To Machine Explainability and Back. Available at http://isaim2018.cs.virginia.edu/papers/ISAIM2018_Ethics_Baum_etal.pdf.
  9. Kevin Baum, Maximilian A. Köhl & Eva Schmidt (2017): Two Challenges for CI Trustworthiness and How to Address Them. In: Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on Explainable Computational Intelligence (XCI 2017), doi:10.18653/v1/W17-3701.
  10. Jeremy Bentham (1789): An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, doi:10.1093/oseo/instance.00077240.
  11. Krister Bykvist (2009): Utilitarianism: A guide for the perplexed. Bloomsbury Publishing.
  12. Vincent Conitzer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jana Schaich Borg, Yuan Deng & Max Kramer (2017): Moral Decision Making Frameworks for Artificial Intelligence.
  13. Jonathan Dancy (2004): Ethics Without Principles. Oxford: Claredon Press, doi:10.1093/0199270023.001.0001.
  14. Jonathan Dancy (2017): Moral Particularism. In: Edward N. Zalta: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, winter 2017 edition. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
  15. Donald Davidson (1963): Actions, Reasons, and Causes. The Journal of Philosophy 60(23), pp. 685–700, doi:10.2307/2023177.
  16. Louise Dennis & Michael Fisher (2018): Practical Challenges in Explicit Ethical Machine Reasoning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.01422.
  17. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2017): What Matters and How It Matters: A Choice-Theoretic Representation of Moral Theories. Philosophical Review 126(4), pp. 421–479, doi:10.1215/00318108-4173412.
  18. Phan Minh Dung (1995): On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming and n-person games. Artificial intelligence 77(2), pp. 321–357, doi:10.1016/0004-3702(94)00041-X.
  19. Pedro R. DArgenio, Gilles Barthe, Sebastian Biewer, Bernd Finkbeiner & Holger Hermanns (2017): Is Your Software on Dope?. In: European Symposium on Programming. Springer, pp. 83–110, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-54434-1_4.
  20. Philippa Foot (1967): The problem of abortion and the doctrine of double effect, doi:10.1093/0199252866.003.0002.
  21. Benjamin Franklin (1887): Letter to J. B. Priestley, 1772, pp. 522. Putnam, New York.
  22. Stephen M. Gardiner (2006): A core precautionary principle. Journal of Political Philosophy 14(1), pp. 33–60, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2006.00237.x.
  23. Carl G. Hempel (1965): Deductive-Nomological Explanation. Aspects of Scientific Explanation, pp. 335–376.
  24. Carl G. Hempel (1965): Inductive-Statistical Explanation. Aspects of Scientific Explanation, pp. 381–393.
  25. Monika Hengstler, Ellen Enkel & Selina Duelli (2016): Applied artificial intelligence and trustThe case of autonomous vehicles and medical assistance devices. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 105, pp. 105–120, doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2015.12.014.
  26. Helmut Horacek (2017): Requirements for Conceptual Representations of Explanations and How Reasoning Systems Can Serve Them. In: Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on Explainable Computational Intelligence (XCI 2017), doi:10.18653/v1/W17-3703.
  27. John Horty (2007): Reasons as Defaults. Philosophers' Imprint 7, pp. 1–28, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199744077.001.0001.
  28. Immanuel Kant (1785): Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.
  29. Popper Karl (1963): Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, doi:10.1063/1.3050617.
  30. Niko Kolodny & John Brunero (2016): Instrumental Rationality. In: Edward N. Zalta: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, winter 2016 edition. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
  31. Pat Langley, Ben Meadows, Mohan Sridharan & Dongkyu Choi (2017): Explainable Agency for Intelligent Autonomous Systems.
  32. Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (2016): Weighing Reasons. Oxford University Press USA, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199315192.001.0001.
  33. Susanne Mantel (2017): Worldly Reasons: An Ontological Inquiry Into Motivating Considerations and Normative Reasons. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, doi:10.1111/papq.12094.
  34. James H. Moor (2006): The nature, importance, and difficulty of machine ethics. IEEE intelligent systems 21(4), pp. 18–21, doi:10.1109/MIS.2006.80.
  35. Douglas W. Portmore (2011): Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. Oxford University Press USA, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794539.003.0007.
  36. William D. Ross (1930): The Right and the Good. Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199252653.001.0001.
  37. John J. C. Smart & Bernard Williams (1973): Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/CBO9780511840852.
  38. Wendell Wallach & Colin Allen (2008): Moral machines: Teaching robots right from wrong. Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195374049.001.0001.
Comments and questions to: eptcs@eptcs.org
For website issues: webmaster@eptcs.org