An Awareness Epistemic Framework for Belief, Argumentation and Their Dynamics

Alfredo Burrieza
(University of Málaga)
Antonio Yuste-Ginel
(University of Málaga)

The notion of argumentation and the one of belief stand in a problematic relation to one another. On the one hand, argumentation is crucial for belief formation: as the outcome of a process of arguing, an agent might come to (justifiably) believe that something is the case. On the other hand, beliefs are an input for argument evaluation: arguments with believed premisses are to be considered as strictly stronger by the agent to arguments whose premisses are not believed. An awareness epistemic logic that captures qualified versions of both principles was recently proposed in the literature. This paper extends that logic in three different directions. First, we try to improve its conceptual grounds, by depicting its philosophical foundations, critically discussing some of its design choices and exploring further possibilities. Second, we provide a (heretofore missing) completeness theorem for the basic fragment of the logic. Third, we study, using techniques from dynamic epistemic logic, how different forms of information change can be captured in the framework.

In Joseph Halpern and Andrés Perea: Proceedings Eighteenth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK 2021), Beijing, China, June 25-27, 2021, Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 335, pp. 69–83.
The research activity of Antonio Yuste-Ginel has been partially funded by the predoctoral grant no. MECD-FPU 2016/04113 of Ministerio de Universidades (Spain).
Published: 22nd June 2021.

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