Games for the Strategic Influence of Expectations

Lluís Godo
Enrico Marchioni

We introduce a new class of games where each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations aside from her own. The way each player intends to exert this influence is expressed through a Boolean combination of polynomial equalities and inequalities with rational coefficients. We offer a logical representation of these games as well as a computational study of the existence of equilibria.

In Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano and Moshe Y. Vardi: Proceedings 2nd International Workshop on Strategic Reasoning (SR 2014), Grenoble, France, April 5-6, 2014, Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 146, pp. 9–15.
Published: 1st April 2014.

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