Partial Preferences for Mediated Bargaining

Piero A. Bonatti
(D.I.E.T.I. Università di Napoli Federico II)
Marco Faella
(D.I.E.T.I. Università di Napoli Federico II)
Luigi Sauro
(D.I.E.T.I. Università di Napoli Federico II)

In this work we generalize standard Decision Theory by assuming that two outcomes can also be incomparable. Two motivating scenarios show how incomparability may be helpful to represent those situations where, due to lack of information, the decision maker would like to maintain different options alive and defer the final decision. In particular, a new axiomatization is given which turns out to be a weakening of the classical set of axioms used in Decision Theory. Preliminary results show how preferences involving complex distributions are related to judgments on single alternatives.

In Fabio Mogavero, Aniello Murano and Moshe Y. Vardi: Proceedings 2nd International Workshop on Strategic Reasoning (SR 2014), Grenoble, France, April 5-6, 2014, Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 146, pp. 105–111.
Published: 1st April 2014.

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