# Equational Theorem Proving for Clauses over Strings 

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#### Abstract

Although reasoning about equations over strings has been extensively studied for several decades, little research has been done for equational reasoning on general clauses over strings. This paper introduces a new superposition calculus with strings and present an equational theorem proving framework for clauses over strings. It provides a saturation procedure for clauses over strings and show that the proposed superposition calculus with contraction rules is refutationally complete. This paper also presents a new decision procedure for word problems over strings w.r.t. a set of conditional equations $R$ over strings if $R$ can be finitely saturated under the proposed inference system.


## 1 Introduction

Strings are fundamental objects in mathematics and many fields of science including computer science and biology. Reasoning about equations over strings has been widely studied in the context of string rewriting systems, formal language theory, word problems in semigroups, monoids and groups [8, 14], etc. Roughly speaking, reasoning about equations over strings replaces equals by equals w.r.t. a given reduction ordering $\succ$. For example, if we have two equations over strings $u_{1} u_{2} u_{3} \approx s$ and $u_{2} \approx t$ with $u_{1} u_{2} u_{3} \succ s$ and $u_{2} \succ t$, where $u_{2}$ is not the empty string, then we may infer the equation $u_{1} t u_{3} \approx s$ by replacing $u_{2}$ in $u_{1} u_{2} u_{3} \approx s$ with $t$. Meanwhile, if we have two equations over strings $u_{1} u_{2} \approx s$ and $u_{2} u_{3} \approx t$ with $u_{1} u_{2} \succ s$ and $u_{2} u_{3} \succ t$, where $u_{2}$ is not the empty string, then we should also be able to infer the equation $u_{1} t \approx s u_{3}$. This can be done by concatenating $u_{3}$ to both sides of $u_{1} u_{2} \approx s$ (i.e., $u_{1} u_{2} u_{3} \approx s u_{3}$ ) and then replacing $u_{2} u_{3}$ in $u_{1} u_{2} u_{3} \approx s u_{3}$ with $t$. Here, the monotonicity property of equations over strings is assumed, i.e., $s \approx t$ implies $u s v \approx u t v$ for strings $s, t, u$, and $v .{ }^{1}$

This reasoning about equations over strings is the basic ingredient for completion $[8,16]$ of string rewriting systems. A completion procedure $[8,16]$ attempts to construct a finite convergent string rewriting system, where a finite convergent string rewriting system provides a decision procedure for its corresponding equational theory.

Unlike reasoning about equations over strings, equational reasoning on general clauses over strings has not been well studied, where clauses are often the essential building blocks for logical statements.

This paper proposes a superposition calculus and an equational theorem proving procedure with clauses over strings. The results presented here generalize the results about completion of equations over strings [8, 16]. Throughout this paper, the monotonicity property of equations over strings is assumed and considered in the proposed inference rules. This assumption is natural and common to equations over strings occurring in algebraic structures (e.g., semigroups and monoids), formal language theory, etc. The cancellation property of equations over strings is not assumed, i.e., $s u \approx t u$ implies $s \approx t$ for strings $s, t$, and a nonempty string $u$ (cf. non-cancellative [8] algebraic structures).

Now, the proposed superposition inference rule is given roughly as follows:

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Superposition: $\frac{C \vee u_{1} u_{2} \approx s \quad D \vee u_{2} u_{3} \approx t}{C \vee D \vee u_{1} t \approx s u_{3}}$
if $u_{2}$ is not the empty string, and $u_{1} u_{2} \succ s$ and $u_{2} u_{3} \succ t$.
Intuitively speaking, using the monotonicity property, $C \vee u_{1} u_{2} u_{3} \approx s u_{3}$ can be obtained from the left premise $C \vee u_{1} u_{2} \approx s$. Then the above inference by Superposition can be viewed as an application of a conditional rewrite rule $D \vee u_{2} u_{3} \approx t$ to $C \vee u_{1} u_{2} u_{3} \approx s u_{3}$, where $u_{2} u_{3}$ in $C \vee u_{1} u_{2} u_{3} \approx s u_{3}$ is now replaced by $t$, and $D$ is appended to the conclusion. (Here, $D$ can be viewed as consisting of the positive and negative conditions.) Note that both $u_{1}$ and $u_{3}$ can be the empty string in the Superposition inference rule. These steps are combined into a single Superposition inference step. For example, suppose that we have three clauses 1: $a b \approx d, 2: b c \approx e$, and 3: $a e \not \approx d c$. We use the Superposition inference rule with 1 and 2, and obtain 4: $a e \approx d c$ from which we derive a contradiction with 3 . The details of the inference rules in the proposed inference system are discussed in Section 3.

The proposed superposition calculus is based on the simple string matching methods and the efficient length-lexicographic ordering instead of using equational unification and the more complex orderings, such as the lexicographic path ordering (LPO) [13] and Knuth-Bendix ordering (KBO) [2].

This paper shows that a clause over strings can be translated into a clause over first-order terms, which allows one to use the existing notion of redundancy in the literature [3,22] for clauses over strings. Based on the notion of redundancy, one may delete redundant clauses using the contraction rules (i.e., Simplification, Subsumption, and Tautology) during an equational theorem proving derivation in order to reduce the search space for a refutation.

The model construction techniques $[3,22]$ is adapted for the refutational completeness of the proposed superposition calculus. This paper also uses a Herbrand interpretation by translating clauses over strings into clauses over first-order terms, where each nonground first-order clause represents all its ground instances. Note that this translation is not needed for the proposed inference system itself.

Finally, the proposed equational theorem proving framework with clauses over strings allows one to provide a new decision procedure for word problems over strings w.r.t. a conditional equational theory $R$ if $R$ can be finitely saturated under the proposed inference system.

## 2 Preliminaries

It is assumed that the reader has some familiarity with equational theorem proving [3,22] and string rewriting systems [8,16,17]. The notion of conditional equations and Horn clauses are discussed in [12].

An alphabet $\Sigma$ is a finite set of symbols (or letters). The set of all strings of symbols over $\Sigma$ is denoted $\Sigma^{*}$ with the empty string $\lambda$.

If $s \in \Sigma^{*}$, then the length of $s$, denoted $|s|$, is defined as follows: $|\lambda|:=0,|a|:=1$ for each $a \in \Sigma$, and $|s a|:=|s|+1$ for $s \in \Sigma^{*}$ and $a \in \Sigma$.

A multiset is an unordered collection with possible duplicate elements. We denote by $M(x)$ the number of occurrences of an object $x$ in a multiset $M$.

An equation is an expression $s \approx t$, where $s$ and $t$ are strings, i.e., $s, t \in \Sigma^{*}$. A literal is either a positive equation $L$, called a positive literal, or a negative equation $\neg L$, called a negative literal. We also write a negative literal $\neg(s \approx t)$ as $s \not \approx t$. We identify a positive literal $s \approx t$ with the multiset $\{\{s\},\{t\}\}$ and a negative literal $s \not \approx t$ with the multiset $\{\{s, t\}\}$. A clause (over $\Sigma^{*}$ ) is a finite multiset of literals, written as a disjunction of literals $\neg A_{1} \vee \cdots \vee \neg A_{m} \vee B_{1} \vee \cdots \vee B_{n}$ or as an implication $\Gamma \rightarrow \Delta$, where
$\Gamma=A_{1} \wedge \cdots \wedge A_{m}$ and $\Delta=B_{1} \vee \cdots \vee B_{n}$. We say that $\Gamma$ is the antecedent and $\Delta$ is the succedent of clause $\Gamma \rightarrow \Delta$. A Horn clause is a clause with at most one positive literal. The empty clause, denoted $\square$, is the clause containing no literals.

A conditional equation is a clause of the form $\left(s_{1} \approx t_{1} \wedge \cdots \wedge s_{n} \approx t_{n}\right) \rightarrow l \approx r$. If $n=0$, a conditional equation is simply an equation. A conditional equation is naturally represented by a Horn clause. A conditional equational theory is a set of conditional equations.

Any ordering $\succ_{S}$ on a set $S$ can be extended to an ordering $\succ_{S}^{m u l}$ on finite multisets over $S$ as follows: $M \succ_{S}^{m u l} N$ if (i) $M \neq N$ and (ii) whenever $N(x)>M(x)$ then $M(y)>N(y)$, for some $y$ such that $y \succ_{S} x$.

Given a multiset $M$ and an ordering $\succ$ on $M$, we say that $x$ is maximal (resp. strictly maximal) in $M$ if there is no $y \in M$ (resp. $y \in M \backslash\{x\}$ ) with $y \succ x$ (resp. $y \succ x$ or $x=y$ ).

An ordering $>$ on $\Sigma^{*}$ is terminating if there is no infinite chain of strings $s>s_{1}>s_{2}>\cdots$ for any $s \in \Sigma^{*}$. An ordering $>$ on $\Sigma^{*}$ is admissible if $u>v$ implies $x u y>x v y$ for all $u, v, x, y \in \Sigma^{*}$. An ordering $>$ on $\Sigma^{*}$ is a reduction ordering if it is terminating and admissible.

The lexicographic ordering $\succ_{l e x}$ induced by a total precedence ordering $\succ_{\text {prec }}$ on $\Sigma$ ranks strings of the same length in $\Sigma^{*}$ by comparing the letters in the first index position where two strings differ using $\succ_{\text {prec }}$. For example, if $a=a_{1} a_{2} \cdots a_{k}$ and $b=b_{1} b_{2} \cdots b_{k}$, and the first index position where $a$ and $b$ are differ is $i$, then $a \succ_{l e x} b$ if and only if $a_{i} \succ_{\text {prec }} b_{i}$.

The length-lexicographic ordering $\succ$ on $\Sigma^{*}$ is defined as follows: $s \succ t$ if and only if $|s|>|t|$, or they have the same length and $s \succ_{l e x} t$ for $s, t \in \Sigma^{*}$. If $\Sigma$ and $\succ_{\text {prec }}$ are fixed, then it is easy to see that we can determine whether $s \succ t$ for two (finite) input strings $s \in \Sigma^{*}$ and $t \in \Sigma^{*}$ in $O(n)$ time, where $n=|s|+|t|$. The length-lexicographic ordering $\succ$ on $\Sigma^{*}$ is a reduction ordering. We also write $\succ$ for a multiset extension of $\succ$ if it is clear from context.

We say that $\approx$ has the monotonicity property over $\Sigma^{*}$ if $s \approx t$ implies $u s v \approx u t v$ for all $s, t, u, v \in \Sigma^{*}$. Throughout this paper, it is assumed that $\approx$ has the monotonicity property over $\Sigma^{*}$.

## 3 Superposition with Strings

### 3.1 Inference Rules

The following inference rules for clauses over strings are parameterized by a selection function $\mathscr{S}$ and the length-lexicographic ordering $\succ$, where $\mathscr{S}$ arbitrarily selects exactly one negative literal for each clause containing at least one negative literal (see Section 3.6 in [22] or Section 6 in [5]). In this strategy, an inference involving a clause with a selected literal is performed before an inference from clauses without a selected literal for a theorem proving process. The intuition behind the (eager) selection of negative literals is that, roughly speaking, one may first prove the whole antecedent of each clause from other clauses. Then clauses with no selected literals are involved in the main deduction process. This strategy is particularly useful when we consider Horn completion in Section 6 and a decision procedure for the word problems associated with it. In the following, the symbol $\bowtie$ is used to denote either $\approx$ or $\not \approx$.

Superposition: $\frac{C \vee u_{1} u_{2} \approx s \quad D \vee u_{2} u_{3} \approx t}{C \vee D \vee u_{1} t \approx s u_{3}}$
if (i) $u_{2}$ is not $\lambda$, (ii) $C$ contains no selected literal, (iii) $D$ contains no selected literal, (iv) $u_{1} u_{2} \succ s$, and (v) $u_{2} u_{3} \succ t .^{2}$

[^1]Rewrite: $\frac{C \vee u_{1} u_{2} u_{3} \bowtie s \quad D \vee u_{2} \approx t}{C \vee D \vee u_{1} t u_{3} \bowtie s}$
if (i) $u_{1} u_{2} u_{3} \bowtie s$ is selected for the left premise whenever $\bowtie$ is $\not \approx$, (ii) $C$ contains no selected literal whenever $\bowtie$ is $\approx$, (iii) $D$ contains no selected literal, and (iv) $u_{2} \succ t .^{3}$

Equality Resolution: $\frac{C \vee s \not \approx s}{C}$
if $s \not \approx s$ is selected for the premise.
The following Paramodulation and Factoring inference rules are used for non-Horn clauses containing positive literals only (cf. Equality Factoring [3,22] and Merging Paramodulation rule [3]).

Paramodulation: $\frac{C \vee s \approx u_{1} u_{2} \quad D \vee u_{2} u_{3} \approx t}{C \vee D \vee s u_{3} \approx u_{1} t}$
if (i) $u_{2}$ is not $\lambda$, (ii) $C$ contains no selected literal, (iii) $C$ contains a positive literal, (iv) $D$ contains no selected literal, (v) $s \succ u_{1} u_{2}$, and (vi) $u_{2} u_{3} \succ t$.

Factoring: $\frac{C \vee s \approx t \vee s u \approx t u}{C \vee s u \approx t u}$
if $C$ contains no selected literal.
In the proposed inference system, finding whether a string $s$ occurs within a string $t$ can be done in linear time in the size of $s$ and $t$ by using the existing string matching algorithms such as the Knuth-Morris-Pratt (KMP) algorithm [9]. For example, the KMP algorithm can be used for finding $u_{2}$ in $u_{1} u_{2} u_{3}$ in the Rewrite rule and finding $u_{2}$ in $u_{1} u_{2}$ in the Superposition and Paramodulation rule.

In the remainder of this paper, we denote by $\mathfrak{S}$ the inference system consisting of the Superposition, Rewrite, Equality Resolution, Paramodulation and the Factoring rule, and denote by $S$ a set of clauses over strings. Also, by the contraction rules we mean the following inference rules-Simplification, Subsumption and Tautology.
Simplification: $\frac{S \cup\left\{C \vee l_{1} l l_{2} \bowtie v, l \approx r\right\}}{S \cup\left\{C \vee l_{1} r l_{2} \bowtie v, l \approx r\right\}}$
if (i) $l_{1} l l_{2} \bowtie v$ is selected for $C \vee l_{1} l l_{2} \bowtie v$ whenever $\bowtie$ is $\not \approx$, (ii) $l_{1}$ is not $\lambda$, and (iii) $l \succ r$.
In the following inference rule, we say that a clause $C$ subsumes a clause $C^{\prime}$ if $C$ is contained in $C^{\prime}$, where $C$ and $C^{\prime}$ are viewed as the finite multisets.

Subsumption: $\frac{S \cup\left\{C, C^{\prime}\right\}}{S \cup\{C\}}$
if $C \subseteq C^{\prime}$.
Tautology: $\frac{S \cup\{C \vee s \approx s\}}{S}$
Example 1. Let $a \succ b \succ c \succ d \succ e$ and consider the following inconsistent set of clauses 1: $a d \approx b \vee a d \approx$ $c, 2: b \approx c, 3: a d \approx e$, and 4: $c \not \approx e$. Now, we show how the empty clause is derived:

[^2]5: $a d \approx c \vee a d \approx c$ (Paramodulation of 1 with 2)
6: $a d \approx c$ (Factoring of 5)
7: $c \approx e$ (Rewrite of 6 with 3)
8: $e \not \approx e(c \not \approx e$ is selected for 4. Rewrite of 4 with 7)
9: $\square(e \not \approx e$ is selected for 8 . Equality Resolution on 8$)$

Note that there is no inference with the selected literal in 4 from the initial set of clauses $1,2,3$, and 4. We produced clauses 5,6 , and 7 without using a selected literal. Once we have clause 7 , there is an inference with the selected literal in 4.
Example 2. Let $a \succ b \succ c \succ d$ and consider the following inconsistent set of clauses 1: $a a \approx a \vee b d \not \approx a$, 2: $c d \approx b, 3: a d \approx c, 4: b d \approx a$, and $5: d a b \not \approx d b$. Now, we show how the empty clause is derived:
6: $a a \approx a \vee a \not \approx a(b d \not \approx a$ is selected for 1 . Rewrite of 1 with 4)
7: $a a \approx a(a \not \approx a$ is selected for 6 . Equality resolution on 6$)$
8: $a c \approx a d$ (Superposition of 7 with 3)
9: $a d d \approx a b$ (Superposition of 8 with 2)
10: $a b \approx c d$ (Rewrite of 9 with 3)
11: $d c d \not \approx d b$ ( $d a b \not \approx d b$ is selected for 5 . Rewrite of 5 with 10)
12: $d b \not \approx d b$ ( $d c d \not \approx d b$ is selected for 11 . Rewrite of 11 with 2)
13: $\square(d b \nsim d b$ is selected for 12 . Equality Resolution on 12$)$

### 3.2 Lifting Properties

Recall that $\Sigma^{*}$ is the set of all strings over $\Sigma$ with the empty string $\lambda$. We let $T(\Sigma \cup\{\perp\})$ be the set of all first-order ground terms over $\Sigma \cup\{\perp\}$, where each letter from $\Sigma$ is interpreted as a unary function symbol and $\perp$ is the only constant symbol. (The constant symbol $\perp$ does not have a special meaning (e.g., "false") in this paper.) We remove parentheses for notational convenience for each term in $T(\Sigma \cup$ $\{\perp\})$. Since $\perp$ is the only constant symbol, we see that $\perp$ occurs only once at the end of each term in $T(\Sigma \cup\{\perp\})$. We may view each term in $T(\Sigma \cup\{\perp\})$ as a string ending with $\perp$. Now, the definitions used in Section 2 can be carried over to the case when $\Sigma^{*}$ is replaced by $T(\Sigma \cup\{\perp\})$. In the remainder of this paper, we use the string notation for terms in $T(\Sigma \cup\{\perp\})$ unless otherwise stated.

Let $s \approx t$ be an equation over $\Sigma^{*}$. Then we can associate $s \approx t$ with the equation $s(x) \approx t(x)$, where $s(x) \approx t(x)$ represents the set of all its ground instances over $T(\Sigma \cup\{\perp\})$. (Here, $\lambda(x)$ and $\lambda \perp$ correspond to $x$ and $\perp$, respectively.) First, $s \approx t$ over $\Sigma^{*}$ corresponds to $s \perp \approx t \perp$ over $T(\Sigma \cup\{\perp\})$. Now, using the monotonicity property, if we concatenate string $u$ to both sides of $s \approx t$ over $\Sigma^{*}$, then we have $s u \approx t u$, which corresponds to $s u \perp \approx t u \perp$.

There is a similar approach in string rewriting systems. If $S$ is a string rewriting system over $\Sigma^{*}$, then it is known that we can associate term rewriting system $R_{S}$ with $S$ in such a way that $R_{S}:=\{l(x) \rightarrow$ $r(x) \mid l \rightarrow r \in S\}$ [8], where $x$ is a variable and each letter from $\Sigma$ is interpreted as a unary function symbol. We may rename variables (by standardizing variables apart) whenever necessary. This approach is particularly useful when we consider critical pairs between the rules in a string rewriting system. For example, if there are two rules $a a \rightarrow c$ and $a b \rightarrow d$ in $S$, then we have $c b \leftarrow a a b \rightarrow a d$, where $<c b, a d>$ (or $\langle a d, c b\rangle$ ) is a critical pair formed from these two rules. This critical pair can also be found if we associate $a a \rightarrow c \in S$ with $a(a(x)) \rightarrow c(x) \in R_{S}$ and $a b \rightarrow d \in S$ with $a(b(x)) \rightarrow d(x) \in R_{S}$. First, we rename the rule $a(b(x)) \rightarrow d(x) \in R_{S}$ into $a(b(y)) \rightarrow d(y)$. Then by mapping $x$ to $b(z)$ and $y$ to $z$, we have $c(b(z)) \leftarrow a(a(b(z))) \rightarrow a(d(z))$, where $<c(b(z)), a(d(z))>$ is a critical pair formed from these two rules. This critical pair can be associated with the critical pair $<c b, a d>$ formed from $a a \rightarrow c$ in $S$ and
$a b \rightarrow d$ in $S$.
However, if $s \not \approx t$ is a negative literal over strings, then we cannot simply associate $s \not \approx t$ with the negative literal $s(x) \not \approx t(x)$ over first-order terms. Suppose to the contrary that we associate $s \not \approx t$ with $s(x) \not \approx t(x)$. Then $s \not \approx t$ implies $s u \not \approx t u$ for a nonempty string $u$ because we can substitute $u(y)$ for $x$ in $s(x) \not \approx t(x)$, and $s u \not \approx t u$ can also be associated with $s(u(y)) \not \approx t(u(y))$. Using the contrapositive argument, this means that $s u \approx t u$ implies $s \approx t$ for the nonempty string $u$. Recall that we do not assume the cancellation property of equations over strings in this paper. ${ }^{4}$ Instead, we simply associate $s \not \approx t$ with $s \perp \not \approx t \perp$. The following lemma is based on the above observations. We denote by $T(\Sigma \cup\{\perp\}, X)$ the set of first-order terms built on $\Sigma \cup\{\perp\}$ and a denumerable set of variables $X$, where each symbol from $\Sigma$ is interpreted as a unary function symbol and $\perp$ is the only constant symbol.
Lemma 1. Let $C:=s_{1} \approx t_{1} \vee \cdots \vee s_{m} \approx t_{m} \vee u_{1} \not \approx v_{1} \vee \cdots \vee u_{n} \not \approx v_{n}$ be a clause over $\Sigma^{*}$ and $P$ be the set of all clauses that follow from $C$ using the monotonicity property. Let $Q$ be the set of all ground instances of the clause $s_{1}\left(x_{1}\right) \approx t_{1}\left(x_{1}\right) \vee \cdots \vee s_{m}\left(x_{m}\right) \approx t_{m}\left(x_{m}\right) \vee u_{1} \perp \not \approx v_{1} \perp \vee \cdots \vee u_{n} \perp \not \approx v_{n} \perp$ over $T(\Sigma \cup\{\perp\}, X)$, where $x_{1}, \ldots, x_{m}$ are distinct variables in $X$ and each letter from $\Sigma$ is interpreted as a unary function symbol. Then there is a one-to-one correspondence between $P$ and $Q$.

Proof. For each element $D$ of $P, D$ has the form $D:=s_{1} w_{1} \approx t_{1} w_{1} \vee \cdots \vee s_{m} w_{m} \approx t_{m} w_{m} \vee u_{1} \not \approx v_{1} \vee$ $\cdots \vee u_{n} \not \approx v_{n}$ for some $w_{1}, \ldots, w_{m} \in \Sigma^{*}$. (If $w_{i}=\lambda$ for all $1 \leq i \leq m$, then $D$ is simply $C$.) Now, we map each element $D$ of $P$ to $D^{\prime}$ in $Q$, where $D^{\prime}:=s_{1} w_{1} \perp \approx t_{1} w_{1} \perp \vee \cdots \vee s_{m} w_{m} \perp \approx t_{m} w_{m} \perp \vee u_{1} \perp \not \approx$ $v_{1} \perp \vee \cdots \vee u_{n} \perp \not \approx v_{n} \perp$. Since $\perp$ is the only constant symbol in $\Sigma \cup\{\perp\}$, it is easy to see that this mapping is well-defined and bijective.

Definition 2. (i) We say that every term in $T(\Sigma \cup\{\perp\})$ is a $g$-term. (Recall that we remove parentheses for notational convenience.)
(ii) Let $s \approx t$ (resp. $s \rightarrow t$ ) be an equation (resp. a rule) over $\Sigma^{*}$. We say that $s u \perp \approx t u \perp$ (resp. $s u \perp \rightarrow t u \perp$ ) for some string $u$ is a g-equation (resp. a $g$-rule) of $s \approx t$ (resp. $s \rightarrow t$ ).
(iii) Let $s \not \approx t$ be a negative literal over $\Sigma^{*}$. We say that $s \perp \not \approx t \perp$ is a (negative) $g$-literal of $s \not \approx t$.
(iv) Let $C:=s_{1} \approx t_{1} \vee \cdots \vee s_{m} \approx t_{m} \vee u_{1} \not \approx v_{1} \vee \cdots \vee u_{n} \not \approx v_{n}$ be a clause over $\Sigma^{*}$. We say that $s_{1} w_{1} \perp \approx$ $t_{1} w_{1} \perp \vee \cdots \vee s_{m} w_{m} \perp \approx t_{m} w_{m} \perp \vee u_{1} \perp \not \approx v_{1} \perp \vee \cdots \vee u_{n} \perp \not \approx v_{n} \perp$ for some strings $w_{1}, \ldots, w_{m}$ is a $g$-clause of clause $C$. Here, each $w_{k} \perp \in T(\Sigma \cup\{\perp\})$ for nonempty string $w_{k}$ in the $g$-clause is said to be a substitution part of $C$.
(v) Let $\pi$ be an inference (w.r.t. $\mathfrak{S}$ ) with premises $C_{1}, \ldots, C_{k}$ and conclusion $D$. Then a $g$-instance of $\pi$ is an inference (w.r.t. S) with premises $C_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, C_{k}^{\prime}$ and conclusion $D^{\prime}$, where $C_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, C_{k}^{\prime}$ and $D^{\prime}$ are $g$-clauses of $C_{1}, \ldots, C_{k}$ and $D$, respectively.

Since each term in $T(\Sigma \cup\{\perp\})$ is viewed as a string, we may consider inferences between $g$-clauses using $\mathfrak{S}$. Note that concatenating a (nonempty) string at the end of a $g$-term is not allowed for any $g$-term over $T(\Sigma \cup\{\perp\})$. For example, $a b c \perp d$ is not a $g$-term, and $a \perp \not \approx b \perp \vee a b c \perp d \approx d e f \perp d$ is not a $g$-clause. We emphasize that we are only concerned with inferences between (legitimate) $g$-clauses here.

We may also use the length-lexicographic ordering $\succ_{g}$ on $g$-terms. Given a total precedence ordering on $\Sigma \cup\{\perp\}$ for which $\perp$ is minimal, it can be easily verified that $\succ_{g}$ is a total reduction ordering on $T(\Sigma \cup\{\perp\})$. We simply denote the multiset extension $\succ_{g}^{m u l}$ of $\succ_{g}$ as $\succ_{g}$ for notational convenience. Similarly, we denote ambiguously all orderings on $g$-terms, $g$-equations, and $g$-clauses over $T(\Sigma \cup\{\perp\})$ by $\succ_{g}$. Now, we consider the lifting of inferences of $\mathfrak{S}$ between $g$-clauses over $T(\Sigma \cup\{\perp\})$ to inferences of $\mathfrak{S}$ between clauses over $\Sigma^{*}$. Let $C_{1}, \ldots, C_{n}$ be clauses over $\Sigma^{*}$ and let

[^3]$$
\frac{C_{1}^{\prime} \ldots C_{n}^{\prime}}{C^{\prime}}
$$
be an inference between their $g$-clauses, where $C_{i}^{\prime}$ is a $g$-clause of $C_{i}$ for all $1 \leq i \leq n$. We say that this inference between $g$-clauses can be lifted if there is an inference
$$
\frac{C_{1} \ldots C_{n}}{C}
$$
such that $C^{\prime}$ is a $g$-clause of $C$. In what follows, we assume that a $g$-literal $L_{i}^{\prime}$ in $C_{i}^{\prime}$ is selected in the same way as $L_{i}$ in $C_{i}$, where $L_{i}$ is a negative literal in $C_{i}$ and $L_{i}^{\prime}$ is a $g$-literal of $L_{i}$.

Lifting of an inference between $g$-clauses is possible if it does not correspond to a $g$-instance of an inference (w.r.t. S) into a substitution part of a clause, which is not necessary (see [4, 22]). Suppose that there is an inference between $g$-clauses $C_{1}^{\prime} \ldots C_{n}^{\prime}$ with conclusion $C^{\prime}$ and there is also an inference between clauses $C_{1} \ldots C_{n}$ over $\Sigma^{*}$ with conclusion $C$, where $C_{i}^{\prime}$ is a $g$-clause of $C_{i}$ for all $1 \leq i \leq n$. Then, the inference between $g$-clauses $C_{1}^{\prime} \ldots C_{n}^{\prime}$ over $T(\Sigma \cup\{\perp\})$ can be lifted to the inference between clauses $C_{1} \ldots C_{n}$ over $\Sigma^{*}$ in such a way that $C^{\prime}$ is a $g$-clause of $C$. This can be easily verified for each inference rule in $\mathfrak{S}$.

Example 3. Consider the following Superposition inference with $g$-clauses:

$$
\frac{a d \perp \approx c d \perp \vee a a b b \perp \approx c b b \perp \quad a b b \perp \approx d b \perp}{a d \perp \approx c d \perp \vee a d b \perp \approx c b b \perp}
$$

where $a d \perp \approx c d \perp \vee a a b b \perp \approx c b b \perp$ (resp. $a b b \perp \approx d b \perp$ ) is a $g$-clause of $a \approx c \vee a a \approx c$ (resp. $a b \approx d$ ) and $a a b b \perp \succ_{g} c b b \perp$ (resp. $a b b \perp \succ_{g} d b \perp$ ). This Superposition inference between $g$-clauses can be lifted to the following Superposition inference between clauses over $\Sigma^{*}$ :

$$
\frac{a \approx c \vee a a \approx c \quad a b \approx d}{a \approx c \vee a d \approx c b}
$$

where $a a \succ c$ and $a b \succ d$. We see that conclusion $a d \perp \approx c d \perp \vee a d b \perp \approx c b b \perp$ of the Superposition inference between the above $g$-clauses is a $g$-clause of conclusion $a \approx c \vee a d \approx c b$ of this inference.
Example 4. Consider the following Rewrite inference with $g$-clauses:

$$
\frac{a \perp \not \approx d \perp \vee a a b b \perp \not \approx c d \perp \quad a b b \perp \approx c b \perp}{a \perp \not \approx d \perp \vee a c b \perp \not \approx c d \perp}
$$

where $a a b b \perp \not \approx c d \perp$ is selected and $a \perp \not \approx d \perp \vee a a b b \perp \not \approx c d \perp$ (resp. $a b b \perp \approx c b \perp$ ) is a $g$-clause of $a \not \approx d \vee a a b b \not \approx c d$ (resp. $a b \approx c$ ) with $a b b \perp \succ_{g} c b \perp$. This Rewrite inference between $g$-clauses can be lifted to the following Rewrite inference between clauses over $\Sigma^{*}$ :

$$
\frac{a \not \approx d \vee a a b b \not \approx c d \quad a b \approx c}{a \not \approx d \vee a c b \not \approx c d}
$$

where $a a b b \not \approx c d$ is selected and $a b \succ c$. We see that conclusion $a \perp \not \approx d \perp \vee a c b \perp \not \approx c d \perp$ of the Rewrite inference between the above $g$-clauses is a $g$-clause of conclusion $a \not \approx d \vee a c b \not \approx c d$ of this inference.

## 4 Redundancy and Contraction Techniques

By Lemma 1 and Definition 2, we may translate a clause $C:=s_{1} \approx t_{1} \vee \cdots \vee s_{m} \approx t_{m} \vee u_{1} \not \approx v_{1} \vee \cdots \vee u_{n} \not \approx$ $v_{n}$ over $\Sigma^{*}$ with all its implied clauses using the monotonicity property into the clause $s_{1}\left(x_{1}\right) \approx t_{1}\left(x_{1}\right) \vee$ $\cdots \vee s_{m}\left(x_{m}\right) \approx t_{m}\left(x_{m}\right) \vee u_{1} \perp \not \approx v_{1} \perp \vee \cdots \vee u_{n} \perp \not \approx v_{n} \perp$ over $T(\Sigma \cup\{\perp\}, X)$ with all its ground instances, where $x_{1}, \ldots, x_{m}$ are distinct variables in $X$, each symbol from $\Sigma$ is interpreted as a unary function symbol, and $\perp$ is the only constant symbol. This allows us to adapt the existing notion of redundancy found in the literature $[3,22]$.

Definition 3. (i) Let $R$ be a set of $g$-equations or $g$-rules. Then the congruence $\leftrightarrow_{R}^{*}$ defines an equality Herbrand Interpretation $I$, where the domain of $I$ is $T(\Sigma \cup\{\perp\})$. Each unary function symbol $s \in \Sigma$ is interpreted as the unary function $s_{I}$, where $s_{I}(u \perp)$ is the $g$-term $s u \perp$. (The constant symbol $\perp$ is simply interpreted as the constant $\perp$.) The only predicate $\approx$ is interpreted by $s \perp \approx t \perp$ if $s \perp \leftrightarrow_{R}^{*} t \perp$. We denote by $R^{*}$ the interpretation $I$ defined by $R$ in this way. I satisfies (is a model of) a $g$-clause $\Gamma \rightarrow \Delta$, denoted by $I \models \Gamma \rightarrow \Delta$, if $I \nsupseteq \Gamma$ or $I \cap \Delta \neq \emptyset$. In this case, we say that $\Gamma \rightarrow \Delta$ is true in $I$. We say that $I$ satisfies a clause $C$ over $\Sigma^{*}$ if $I$ satisfies all $g$-clauses of $C$. We say that $I$ satisfies a set of clauses $S$ over $\Sigma^{*}$, denoted by $I \models S$, if $I$ satisfies every clause in $S$.
(ii) A $g$-clause $C$ follows from a set of $g$-clauses $\left\{C_{1}, \ldots, C_{n}\right\}$, denoted by $\left\{C_{1}, \ldots, C_{n}\right\} \models C$, if $C$ is true in every model of $\left\{C_{1}, \ldots, C_{k}\right\}$.
Definition 4. Let $S$ be a set of clauses over $\Sigma^{*}$.
(i) A $g$-clause $C$ is redundant w.r.t. $S$ if there exist $g$-clauses $C_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, C_{k}^{\prime}$ of clauses $C_{1}, \ldots, C_{k}$ in $S$, such that $\left\{C_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, C_{k}^{\prime}\right\} \models C$ and $C \succ_{g} C_{i}^{\prime}$ for all $1 \leq i \leq k$. A clause in $S$ is redundant w.r.t. $S$ if all its $g$-clauses are redundant w.r.t. $S$.
(ii) An inference $\pi$ with conclusion $D$ is redundant w.r.t. $S$ if for every $g$-instance of $\pi$ with maximal premise $C^{\prime}\left(\right.$ w.r.t. $\left.\succ_{g}\right)$ and conclusion $D^{\prime}$, there exist $g$-clauses $C_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, C_{k}^{\prime}$ of clauses $C_{1}, \ldots, C_{k}$ in $S$ such that $\left\{C_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, C_{k}^{\prime}\right\} \models D^{\prime}$ and $C^{\prime} \succ_{g} C_{i}^{\prime}$ for all $1 \leq i \leq k$, where $D^{\prime}$ is a $g$-clause of $D$.
Lemma 5. If an equation $l \approx r$ simplifies a clause $C \vee l_{1} l_{2} \bowtie v$ into $C \vee l_{1} r l_{2} \bowtie v$ using the Simplification rule, then $C \vee l_{1} l l_{2} \bowtie v$ is redundant w.r.t. $\left\{C \vee l_{1} r l_{2} \bowtie v, l \approx r\right\}$.

Proof. Suppose that $l \approx r$ simplifies $D:=C \vee l_{1} l_{2} \not \approx v$ into $C \vee l_{1} r l_{2} \not \approx v$, where $l_{1} l l_{2} \not \approx v$ is selected for $D$. Then, every $g$-clause $D^{\prime}$ of $D$ has the form $D^{\prime}:=C^{\prime} \vee l_{1} l_{2} \perp \not \approx v \perp$, where $C^{\prime}$ is a $g$-clause of $C$. Now, we may infer that $\left\{D^{\prime \prime}, l l_{2} \perp \approx r l_{2} \perp\right\} \models D^{\prime}$, where $D^{\prime \prime}:=C^{\prime} \vee l_{1} r l_{2} \perp \not \approx v \perp$ is a $g$-clause of $C \vee l_{1} r l_{2} \not \approx v$ and $l l_{2} \perp \approx r l_{2} \perp$ is a $g$-equation of $l \approx r$. We also have $D^{\prime} \succ_{g} D^{\prime \prime}$ and $D^{\prime} \succ_{g} l l_{2} \perp \approx r l_{2} \perp$, and thus the conclusion follows.

Otherwise, suppose that $l \approx r$ simplifies $D:=C \vee l_{1} l l_{2} \approx v$ into $C \vee l_{1} r l_{2} \approx v$. Then every $g$-clause $D^{\prime}$ of $D$ has the form $D^{\prime}:=C^{\prime} \vee l_{1} l l_{2} w \perp \approx v w \perp$ for some $w \in \Sigma^{*}$, where $C^{\prime}$ is a $g$-clause of $C$. Now, we have $\left\{D^{\prime \prime}, l l_{2} w \perp \approx r l_{2} w \perp\right\} \models D^{\prime}$, where $D^{\prime \prime}:=C^{\prime} \vee l_{1} r l_{2} w \perp \approx v w \perp$ is a $g$-clause of $C \vee l_{1} r l_{2} \approx v$ for some $w \in \Sigma^{*}$ and $l l_{2} w \perp \approx r l_{2} w \perp$ is a $g$-equation of $l \approx r$. We also have $D^{\prime} \succ_{g} D^{\prime \prime}$ and $D^{\prime} \succ_{g} l l_{2} w \perp \approx$ $r l_{2} w \perp$ because $l_{1}$ is not $\lambda$ in the condition of the rule (i.e., $l_{1} l l_{2} w \perp \succ_{g} l l_{2} w \perp$ ), and thus the conclusion follows.

We see that if $C$ subsumes $C^{\prime}$ with $C$ and $C^{\prime}$ containing the same number of literals, then they are the same when viewed as the finite multisets, so we can remove $C^{\prime}$. Therefore, we exclude this case in the following lemma.

Lemma 6. If a clause C subsumes a clause D and C contains fewer literals than D, then D is redundant w.r.t. $\{C\}$.

Proof. Suppose that $C$ subsumes $D$ and $C$ contains fewer literals than $D$. Then $D$ can be denoted by $C \vee B$ for some nonempty clause $B$. Now, for every $g$-clause $D^{\prime}:=C^{\prime} \vee B^{\prime}$ of $D$, we have $\left\{C^{\prime}\right\} \models D^{\prime}$ with $D^{\prime} \succ_{g} C^{\prime}$, where $C^{\prime}$ and $B^{\prime}$ are $g$-clauses of $C$ and $B$, respectively. Thus, $D$ is redundant w.r.t. $\{C\}$.

Lemma 7. A tautology $C \vee s \approx s$ is redundant.
Proof. It is easy to see that for every $g$-clause $C^{\prime} \vee s u \perp \approx s u \perp$ of $C \vee s \approx s$, we have $\models C^{\prime} \vee s u \perp \approx s u \perp$, where $u \in \Sigma^{*}$ and $C^{\prime}$ is a $g$-clause of $C$. Thus, $C \vee s \approx s$ is redundant.

## 5 Refutational Completeness

In this section, we adapt the model construction and equational theorem proving techniques used in [3, 18,22 ] and show that $\mathfrak{S}$ with the contraction rules is refutationally complete.

Definition 8. A $g$-equation $s \perp \approx t \perp$ is reductive for a $g$-clause $C:=D \vee s \perp \approx t \perp$ if $s \perp \approx t \perp$ is strictly maximal (w.r.t. $\succ_{g}$ ) in $C$ with $s \perp \succ_{g} t \perp$.
Definition 9. (Model Construction) Let $S$ be a set of clauses over $\Sigma^{*}$. We use induction on $\succ_{g}$ to define the sets $R_{C}, E_{C}$, and $I_{C}$ for all $g$-clauses $C$ of clauses in $S$. Let $C$ be such a $g$-clause of a clause in $S$ and suppose that $E_{C^{\prime}}$ has been defined for all $g$-clauses $C^{\prime}$ of clauses in $S$ for which $C \succ_{g} C^{\prime}$. Then we define by $R_{C}=\bigcup_{C \succ_{g} C^{\prime}} E_{C^{\prime}}$. We also define by $I_{C}$ the equality interpretation $R_{C}^{*}$, which denotes the least congruence containing $R_{C}$.

Now, let $C:=D \vee s \perp \approx t \perp$ such that $C$ is not a $g$-clause of a clause with a selected literal in $S$. Then $C$ produces $E_{C}=\{s \perp \rightarrow t \perp\}$ if the following conditions are met: (1) $I_{C} \not \models C$, (2) $I_{C} \not \models t \perp \approx t^{\prime} \perp$ for every $s \perp \approx t^{\prime} \perp$ in $D$, (3) $s \perp \approx t \perp$ is reductive for $C$, and (4) $s \perp$ is irreducible by $R_{C}$. We say that $C$ is productive and produces $E_{C}$ if it satisfies all of the above conditions. Otherwise, $E_{C}=\emptyset$. Finally, we define $I_{S}$ as the equality interpretation $R_{S}^{*}$, where $R_{S}=\bigcup_{C} E_{C}$ is the set of all $g$-rules produced by $g$-clauses of clauses in $S$.
Lemma 10. (i) $R_{S}$ has the Church-Rosser property.
(ii) $R_{S}$ is terminating.
(iii) For $g$-terms $u \perp$ and $v \perp, I_{S} \models u \perp \approx v \perp$ if and only if $u \perp \downarrow_{R_{S}} v \perp$.
(iv) If $I_{S} \models s \approx t$, then $I_{S} \models u s v \approx u t v$ for nonempty strings $s, t, u, v \in \Sigma^{*}$.

Proof. (i) $R_{S}$ is left-reduced because there are no overlaps among the left-hand sides of rewrite rules in $R_{S}$, and thus $R_{S}$ has the Church-Rosser property.
(ii) For each rewrite rule $l \perp \rightarrow r \perp$ in $R_{S}$, we have $l \perp \succ_{g} r \perp$, and thus $R_{S}$ is terminating.
(iii) Since $R_{S}$ has the Church-Rosser property and is terminating by (i) and (ii), respectively, $R_{S}$ is convergent. Thus, $I_{S} \models u \perp \approx v \perp$ if and only if $u \perp \downarrow_{R_{S}} v \perp$ for $g$-terms $u \perp$ and $v \perp$.
(iv) Suppose that $I_{S} \models s \approx t$ for nonempty strings $s$ and $t$. Then, we have $I_{S} \models s v w \perp \approx t v w \perp$ for all strings $v$ and $w$ by Definition 3(i). Similarly, since $I_{S}$ is an equality Herbrand interpretation, we also have $I_{S} \models u s v w \perp \approx u t v w \perp$ for all strings $u$, which means that $I_{S} \models u s v \approx u t v$ by Definition 3(i).

Lemma 10(iv) says that the monotonicity assumption used in this paper holds w.r.t. a model constructed by Definition 9 .
Definition 11. Let $S$ be a set of clauses over $\Sigma^{*}$. We say that $S$ is saturated under $\mathfrak{S}$ if every inference by $\mathfrak{S}$ with premises in $S$ is redundant w.r.t. $S$.
Definition 12. Let $C:=s_{1} \approx t_{1} \vee \cdots \vee s_{m} \approx t_{m} \vee u_{1} \not \approx v_{1} \vee \cdots \vee u_{n} \not \approx v_{n}$ be a clause over $\Sigma^{*}$, and $C^{\prime}=$ $s_{1} w_{1} \perp \approx t_{1} w_{1} \perp \vee \cdots \vee s_{m} w_{m} \perp \approx t_{m} w_{m} \perp \vee u_{1} \perp \not \approx v_{1} \perp \vee \cdots \vee u_{n} \perp \not \approx v_{n} \perp$ for some strings $w_{1}, \ldots, w_{m}$ be a $g$-clause of $C$. We say that $C^{\prime}$ is a reduced $g$-clause of $C$ w.r.t. a rewrite system $R$ if every $w_{i} \perp, 1 \leq i \leq m$, is not reducible by $R$.

In the proof of the following lemma, we write $s[t]_{\text {suf }}$ to indicate that $t$ occurs in $s$ as a suffix and (ambiguously) denote by $s[u]_{\text {suf }}$ the result of replacing the occurrence of $t$ (as a suffix of $s$ ) by $u$.

Lemma 13. Let $S$ be saturated under $\mathfrak{S}$ not containing the empty clause and $C$ be a g-clause of a clause in $S$. Then $C$ is true in $I_{S}$. More specifically,
(i) If $C$ is redundant w.r.t. $S$, then it is true in $I_{S}$.
(ii) If $C$ is not a reduced $g$-clause of a clause in $S$ w.r.t. $R_{S}$, then it is true in $I_{S}$.
(iii) If $C:=C^{\prime} \vee s \perp \approx t \perp$ produces the rule $s \perp \rightarrow t \perp$, then $C^{\prime}$ is false and $C$ is true in $I_{S}$.
(iv) If $C$ is a $g$-clause of a clause in $S$ with a selected literal, then it is true in $I_{S}$.
(v) If $C$ is non-productive, then it is true in $I_{S}$.

Proof. We use induction on $\succ_{g}$ and assume that (i)-(v) hold for every $g$-clause $D$ of a clause in $S$ with $C \succ_{g} D$.
(i) Suppose that $C$ is redundant w.r.t. $S$. Then there exist $g$-clauses $C_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, C_{k}^{\prime}$ of clauses $C_{1}, \ldots, C_{k}$ in $S$, such that $\left\{C_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, C_{k}^{\prime}\right\} \models C$ and $C \succ_{g} C_{i}^{\prime}$ for all $1 \leq i \leq k$. By the induction hypothesis, each $C_{i}^{\prime}$, $1 \leq i \leq k$, is true in $I_{S}$. Thus, $C$ is true in $I_{S}$.
(ii) Suppose that $C$ is a $g$-clause of a clause $B:=s_{1} \approx t_{1} \vee \cdots \vee s_{m} \approx t_{m} \vee u_{1} \not \approx v_{1} \vee \cdots \vee u_{n} \not \approx v_{n}$ in $S$ but is not a reduced $g$-clause w.r.t. $R_{S}$. Then $C$ is of the form $C:=s_{1} w_{1} \perp \approx t_{1} w_{1} \perp \vee \cdots \vee s_{m} w_{m} \perp \approx$ $t_{m} w_{m} \perp \vee u_{1} \perp \not \approx v_{1} \perp \vee \cdots \vee u_{n} \perp \not \approx v_{n} \perp$ for $w_{1}, \ldots, w_{m} \in \Sigma^{*}$ and some $w_{k} \perp$ is reducible by $R_{S}$. Now, consider $C^{\prime}=s_{1} w_{1}^{\prime} \perp \approx t_{1} w_{1}^{\prime} \perp \vee \cdots \vee s_{m} w_{m}^{\prime} \perp \approx t_{m} w_{m}^{\prime} \perp \vee u_{1} \perp \not \approx v_{1} \perp \vee \cdots \vee u_{n} \perp \not \approx v_{n} \perp$, where $w_{i}^{\prime} \perp$ is the normal form of $w_{i} \perp$ w.r.t. $R_{S}$ for each $1 \leq i \leq m$. Then $C^{\prime}$ is a reduced $g$-clause of $B$ w.r.t. $R_{S}$, and is true in $I_{S}$ by the induction hypothesis. Since each $w_{i} \perp \approx w_{i}^{\prime} \perp, 1 \leq i \leq m$, is true in $I_{S}$ by Lemma 10(iii), we may infer that $C$ is true in $I_{S}$.

In the remainder of the proof of this lemma, we assume that $C$ is neither redundant w.r.t. $S$ nor is it a reducible $g$-clause w.r.t. $R_{S}$ of some clause in $S$. (Otherwise, we are done by (i) or (ii).)
(iii) Suppose that $C:=C^{\prime} \vee s \perp \approx t \perp$ produces the rule $s \perp \rightarrow t \perp$. Since $s \perp \rightarrow t \perp \in E_{C} \subset R_{S}$, we see that $C$ is true in $I_{S}$. We show that $C^{\prime}$ is false in $I_{S}$. Let $C^{\prime}:=\Gamma \rightarrow \Delta$. Then $I_{C} \not \models C^{\prime}$ by Definition 9 , which implies that $I_{C} \cap \Delta=\emptyset, I_{C} \supseteq \Gamma$, and thus $I_{S} \supseteq \Gamma$. It remains to show that $I_{S} \cap \Delta=\emptyset$. Suppose to the contrary that $\Delta$ contains an equation $s^{\prime} \perp \approx t^{\prime} \perp$ which is true in $I_{s}$. Since $I_{C} \cap \Delta=\emptyset$, we must have $s^{\prime} \perp \approx t^{\prime} \perp \in I \backslash I_{C}$, which is only possible if $s \perp=s^{\prime} \perp$ and $I_{C} \models t \perp \approx t^{\prime} \perp$, contradicting condition (2) in Definition 9.
(iv) Suppose that $C$ is of the form $C:=B^{\prime} \vee s \perp \not \approx t \perp$, where $s \perp \not \approx t \perp$ is a $g$-literal of a selected literal in a clause in $S$ and $B^{\prime}$ is a $g$-clause of $B$.
(iv.1) If $s \perp=t \perp$, then $B^{\prime}$ is an equality resolvent of $C$ and the Equality Resolution inferences can be lifted. By saturation of $S$ under $\mathfrak{S}$ and the induction hypothesis, $B^{\prime}$ is true in $I_{S}$. Thus, $C$ is true in $I_{S}$.
(iv.2) If $s \perp \neq t \perp$, then suppose to the contrary that $C$ is false in $I_{S}$. Then we have $I_{S} \models s \perp \approx t \perp$, which implies that $s \perp$ or $t \perp$ is reducible by $R_{S}$ by Lemma 10 (iii). Without loss of generality, we assume that $s \perp$ is reducible by $R_{S}$ with some rule $l u \perp \rightarrow r u \perp$ for some $u \in \Sigma^{*}$ produced by a productive $g$-clause $D^{\prime} \vee l u \perp \approx r u \perp$ of a clause $D \vee l \approx r \in S$. This means that $s \perp$ has a suffix $l u \perp$. Now, consider the following inference by Rewriting:

$$
\frac{B \vee s[l u]_{\text {suf }} \not \approx t \quad D \vee l \approx r}{B \vee D \vee s[r u]_{\text {suf }} \not \approx t}
$$

where $s[l u]_{s u f} \not \approx t$ is selected for the left premise. The conclusion of the above inference has a $g$-clause $C^{\prime}:=B^{\prime} \vee D^{\prime} \vee s \perp[r u \perp]_{\text {suf }} \not \approx t \perp$. By saturation of $S$ under $\mathfrak{S}$ and the induction hypothesis, $C^{\prime}$ must be true in $I_{S}$. Moreover, we see that $s \perp[r u \perp]_{\text {suf }} \not \approx t \perp$ is false in $I_{S}$ by Lemma 10 (iii), and $D^{\prime}$ are false in $I_{S}$ by (iii). This means that $B^{\prime}$ is true in $I_{S}$, and thus $C$ (i.e., $C=B^{\prime} \vee s \perp \not \approx t \perp$ ) is true in $I_{S}$, which is the required contradiction.
(v) If $C$ is non-productive, then we assume that $C$ is not a $g$-clause of a clause with a selected literal. Otherwise, the proof is done by (iv). This means that $C$ is of the form $C:=B^{\prime} \vee s u \perp \approx t u \perp$, where $s u \perp \approx$ $t u \perp$ is maximal in $C$ and $B^{\prime}$ contains no selected literal. If $s u \perp=t u \perp$, then we are done. Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume that $s u \perp \succ_{g} t u \perp$. As $C$ is non-productive, it means that (at least)
one of the conditions in Definition 9 does not hold.
If condition (1) does not hold, then $I_{C} \models C$, so we have $I_{S} \models C$, i.e., $C$ is true in $I_{S}$. If condition (1) holds but condition (2) does not hold, then $C$ is of the form $C:=B_{1}^{\prime} \vee s u \perp \approx t u \perp \vee s v w \perp \approx t^{\prime} v w \perp$, where $s u=s v w$ (i.e., $u=v w$ ) and $I_{C} \models t u \perp \approx t^{\prime} v w \perp$.

Suppose first that $t u \perp=t^{\prime} v w \perp$. Then we have $t=t^{\prime}$ since $u=v w$. Now, consider the following inference by Factoring:

$$
\frac{B_{1} \vee s \approx t \vee s v \approx t v}{B_{1} \vee s v \approx t v}
$$

The conclusion of the above inference has a $g$-clause $C^{\prime}:=B_{1}^{\prime} \vee s v w \perp \approx t v w \perp$, i.e., $C^{\prime}:=B_{1}^{\prime} \vee s u \perp \approx t u \perp$ since $u=v w$. By saturation of $S$ under $\mathfrak{S}$ and the induction hypothesis, $C^{\prime}$ is true in $I_{S}$, and thus $C$ is true in $I_{S}$.

Otherwise, suppose that $t u \perp \neq t^{\prime} v w \perp$. Then we have $t u \perp \downarrow_{R_{C}} t^{\prime} v w \perp$ by Lemma 10 (iii) and $t u \perp \succ_{g}$ $t^{\prime} v w \perp$ because $s u \perp \approx t u \perp$ is maximal in $C$. This means that $t u \perp$ is reducible by $R_{C}$ by some rule $l \tau \perp \rightarrow r \tau \perp$ produced by a productive $g$-clause $D^{\prime} \vee l \tau \perp \approx r \tau \perp$ of a clause $D \vee l \approx r \in S$. Now, we need to consider two cases:
(v.1) If $t$ has the form $t:=u_{1} u_{2}$ and $l$ has the form $l:=u_{2} u_{3}$, then consider the following inference by Paramodulation:

$$
\frac{B \vee s \approx u_{1} u_{2} \quad D \vee u_{2} u_{3} \approx r}{B \vee D \vee s u_{3} \approx u_{1} r}
$$

The conclusion of the above inference has a $g$-clause $C^{\prime}:=B^{\prime} \vee D^{\prime} \vee s u_{3} \tau \perp \approx u_{1} r \tau \perp$ with $u=u_{3} \tau$. By saturation of $S$ under $\mathfrak{S}$ and the induction hypothesis, $C^{\prime}$ is true in $I_{S}$. Since $D^{\prime}$ is false in $I_{S}$ by (iii), either $B^{\prime}$ or $s u_{3} \tau \perp \approx u_{1} r \tau \perp$ is true in $I_{S}$. If $B^{\prime}$ is true in $I_{S}$, so is $C$. If $s u_{3} \tau \perp \approx u_{1} r \tau \perp$ is true in $I_{S}$, then $s u \perp \approx t u \perp$ is also true in $I_{S}$ by Lemma 10 (iii), where $t=u_{1} u_{2}$ and $u=u_{3} \tau$. Thus, $C$ is true in $I_{S}$.
(v.2) If $t$ has the form $t:=u_{1} u_{2} u_{3}$ and $l$ has the form $l:=u_{2}$, then consider the following inference by Rewrite:

$$
\frac{B \vee s \approx u_{1} u_{2} u_{3} \quad D \vee u_{2} \approx r}{B \vee D \vee s \approx u_{1} r u_{3}}
$$

The conclusion of the above inference has a $g$-clause $C^{\prime \prime}:=B^{\prime} \vee D^{\prime} \vee s u \perp \approx u_{1} r u_{3} u \perp$ with $\tau=u_{3} u$. By saturation of $S$ under $\mathfrak{S}$ and the induction hypothesis, $C^{\prime \prime}$ is true in $I_{S}$. Since $D^{\prime}$ is false in $I_{S}$ by (iii), either $B^{\prime}$ or $s u \perp \approx u_{1} r u_{3} u \perp$ is true in $I_{S}$. Similarly to case (v.1), if $B^{\prime}$ is true in $I_{S}$, so is $C$. If $s u \perp \approx u_{1} r u_{3} u \perp$ is true in $I_{S}$, then $s u \perp \approx t u \perp$ is also true in $I_{S}$ by Lemma 10(iii), where $t=u_{1} u_{2} u_{3}$. Thus, $C$ is true in $I_{S}$.

If conditions (1) and (2) hold but condition (3) does not hold, then $s u \perp \approx t u \perp$ is only maximal but is not strictly maximal, so we are in the previous case. (Since $\succ_{g}$ is total on $g$-clauses, condition (2) does not hold.) If conditions (1)-(3) hold but condition (4) does not hold, then $s u \perp$ is reducible by $R_{C}$ by some rule $l \tau \perp \rightarrow r \tau \perp$ produced by a productive $g$ clause $D^{\prime} \vee l \tau \perp \approx r \tau \perp$ of a clause $D \vee l \approx r \in S$. Again, we need to consider two cases:
(v.1') If $s$ has the form $s:=u_{1} u_{2}$ and $l$ has the form $l:=u_{2} u_{3}$, then consider the following inference by Superposition:

$$
\frac{B \vee u_{1} u_{2} \approx t \quad D \vee u_{2} u_{3} \approx r}{B \vee D \vee u_{1} r \approx t u_{3}}
$$

The conclusion of the above inference has a $g$-clause $C^{\prime}:=B^{\prime} \vee D^{\prime} \vee u_{1} r \tau \perp \approx t u_{3} \tau \perp$ with $u=u_{3} \tau$. By saturation of $S$ under $\mathfrak{S}$ and the induction hypothesis, $C^{\prime}$ is true in $I_{S}$. Since $D^{\prime}$ is false in $I_{S}$ by (iii), either $B^{\prime}$ or $u_{1} r \tau \perp \approx t u_{3} \tau \perp$ is true in $I_{S}$. If $B^{\prime}$ is true in $I_{S}$, so is $C$. If $u_{1} r \tau \perp \approx t u_{3} \tau \perp$ is true in $I_{S}$, then $s u \perp \approx t u \perp$ is also true in $I_{S}$ by Lemma 10 (iii), where $s=u_{1} u_{2}$ and $u=u_{3} \tau$. Thus, $C$ is true in $I_{S}$.
(v.2') If $s$ has the form $s:=u_{1} u_{2} u_{3}$ and $l$ has the form $l:=u_{2}$, then consider the following inference by Rewrite:

$$
\frac{B \vee u_{1} u_{2} u_{3} \approx t \quad D \vee u_{2} \approx r}{B \vee D \vee u_{1} r u_{3} \approx t}
$$

The conclusion of the above inference has a $g$-clause $C^{\prime \prime}:=B^{\prime} \vee D^{\prime} \vee u_{1} r u_{3} u \perp \approx t u \perp$ with $\tau=u_{3} u$. By saturation of $S$ under $\mathfrak{S}$ and the induction hypothesis, $C^{\prime \prime}$ is true in $I_{S}$. Since $D^{\prime}$ is false in $I_{S}$ by (iii), either $B^{\prime}$ or $u_{1} r u_{3} u \perp \approx t u \perp$ is true in $I_{S}$. Similarly to case (v.1'), If $B^{\prime}$ is true in $I_{S}$, so is $C$. If $u_{1} r u_{3} u \perp \approx t u \perp$ is true in $I_{S}$, then $s u \perp \approx t u \perp$ is also true in $I_{S}$ by Lemma 10 (iii), where $s=u_{1} u_{2} u_{3}$. Thus, $C$ is true in $I_{S}$.

Definition 14. (i) A theorem proving derivation is a sequence of sets of clauses $S_{0}=S, S_{1}, \ldots$ over $\Sigma^{*}$ such that:
(i.1) Deduction: $S_{i}=S_{i-1} \cup\{C\}$ if $C$ can be deduced from premises in $S_{i-1}$ by applying an inference rule in $\mathfrak{S}$.
(i.2) Deletion: $S_{i}=S_{i-1} \backslash\{D\}$ if $D$ is redundant w.r.t. $S_{i-1} .{ }^{5}$
(ii) The set $S_{\infty}:=\bigcup_{i}\left(\bigcap_{j \geq i} S_{j}\right)$ is the limit of the theorem proving derivation.

We see that the soundness of a theorem proving derivation w.r.t. the proposed inference system is straightforward, i.e., $S_{i} \models S_{i+1}$ for all $i \geq 0$.
Definition 15. A theorem proving derivation $S_{0}, S_{1}, S_{2}, \ldots$ is fair w.r.t. the inference system $\mathfrak{S}$ if every inference by $\mathfrak{S}$ with premises in $S_{\infty}$ is redundant w.r.t. $\bigcup_{j} S_{j}$.
Lemma 16. Let $S$ and $S^{\prime}$ be sets of clauses over $\Sigma^{*}$.
(i) If $S \subseteq S^{\prime}$, then any clause which is redundant w.r.t. $S$ is also redundant w.r.t. $S^{\prime}$.
(ii) If $S \subseteq S^{\prime}$ and all clauses in $S^{\prime} \backslash S$ are redundant w.r.t. $S^{\prime}$, then any clause or inference which is redundant w.r.t. $S^{\prime}$ is also redundant w.r.t. $S$.

Proof. The proof of part (i) is obvious. For part (ii), suppose that a clause $C$ is redundant w.r.t. $S^{\prime}$ and let $C^{\prime}$ be a $g$-clause of it. Then there exists a minimal set $N:=\left\{C_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, C_{n}^{\prime}\right\}$ (w.r.t. $\succ_{g}$ ) of $g$-clauses of clauses in $S^{\prime}$ such that $N \models C^{\prime}$ and $C^{\prime} \succ_{g} C_{i}^{\prime}$ for all $1 \leq i \leq n$. We claim that all $C_{i}^{\prime}$ in $N$ are not redundant w.r.t. $S^{\prime}$, which shows that $C^{\prime}$ is redundant w.r.t. $S$. Suppose to the contrary that some $C_{j}^{\prime}$ is redundant w.r.t. $S^{\prime}$. Then there exist a set $N^{\prime}:=\left\{D_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, D_{m}^{\prime}\right\}$ of $g$-clauses of clauses in $S^{\prime}$ such that $N^{\prime} \models C_{j}^{\prime}$ and $C_{j}^{\prime} \succ_{g} D_{i}^{\prime}$ for all $1 \leq i \leq m$. This means that we have $\left\{C_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, C_{j-1}^{\prime}, D_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, D_{m}^{\prime}, C_{j+1}^{\prime}, \ldots, C_{n}^{\prime}\right\} \models C^{\prime}$, which contradicts our minimal choice of the set $N=\left\{C_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, C_{n}^{\prime}\right\}$.

Next, suppose an inference $\pi$ with conclusion $D$ is redundant w.r.t. $S^{\prime}$ and let $\pi^{\prime}$ be a $g$-instance of it such that $B$ is the maximal premise and $D^{\prime}$ is the conclusion of $\pi^{\prime}$ (i.e., a $g$-clause of $D$ ). Then there exists a minimal set $P:=\left\{D_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, D_{n}^{\prime}\right\}$ (w.r.t. $\succ_{g}$ ) of $g$-clauses of clauses in $S^{\prime}$ such that $P \models D^{\prime}$ and $B \succ_{g} D_{i}^{\prime}$ for all $1 \leq i \leq n$. As above, we may infer that all $D_{i}^{\prime}$ in $P$ are not redundant w.r.t. $S^{\prime}$, and thus $\pi^{\prime}$ is redundant w.r.t. $S$.

Lemma 17. Let $S_{0}, S_{1}, \ldots$ be a fair theorem proving derivation w.r.t. $\mathfrak{S}$. Then $S_{\infty}$ is saturated under $\mathfrak{S}$.

[^4]Proof. If $S_{\infty}$ contains the empty clause, then it is obvious that $S_{\infty}$ is saturated under $\mathfrak{S}$. Therefore, we assume that the empty clause is not in $S_{\infty}$.

If a clause $C$ is deleted in a theorem proving derivation, then $C$ is redundant w.r.t. some $S_{j}$. By Lemma 16(i), it is also redundant w.r.t. $\bigcup_{j} S_{j}$. Similarly, every clause in $\bigcup_{j} S_{j} \backslash S_{\infty}$ is redundant w.r.t. $\bigcup_{j} S_{j}$.

By fairness, every inference $\pi$ by $\mathfrak{S}$ with premises in $S_{\infty}$ is redundant w.r.t. $\bigcup_{j} S_{j}$. Using Lemma 16(ii) and the above, $\pi$ is also redundant w.r.t. $S_{\infty}$, which means that $S_{\infty}$ is saturated under $\mathfrak{S}$.

Theorem 18. Let $S_{0}, S_{1}, \ldots$ be a fair theorem proving derivation w.r.t. $\mathfrak{S}$. If $S_{\infty}$ does not contain the empty clause, then $I_{S_{\infty}} \models S_{0}$ (i.e., $S_{0}$ is satisfiable.)

Proof. Suppose that $S_{0}, S_{1}, \ldots$ is a fair theorem proving derivation w.r.t. $\mathcal{S}$ and that its limit $S_{\infty}$ does not contain the empty clause. Then $S_{\infty}$ is saturated under $\mathfrak{S}$ by Lemma 17 . Let $C^{\prime}$ be a $g$-clause of a clause $C$ in $S_{0}$. If $C \in S_{\infty}$, then $C^{\prime}$ is true in $I_{S_{\infty}}$ by Lemma 13. Otherwise, if $C \notin S_{\infty}$, then $C$ is redundant w.r.t. some $S_{j}$. It follows that $C$ redundant w.r.t. $\bigcup_{j} S_{j}$ by Lemma 16(i), and thus redundant w.r.t. $S_{\infty}$ by Lemma 16(ii). This means that there exist $g$-clauses $C_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, C_{k}^{\prime}$ of clauses $C_{1}, \ldots, C_{k}$ in $S_{\infty}$ such that $\left\{C_{1}^{\prime}, \ldots, C_{k}^{\prime}\right\} \models C^{\prime}$ and $C^{\prime} \succ_{g} C_{i}^{\prime}$ for all $1 \leq i \leq k$. Since each $C_{i}^{\prime}, 1 \leq i \leq k$, is true in $I_{S_{\infty}}$ by Lemma 13, $C^{\prime}$ is also true in $I_{S_{\infty}}$, and thus the conclusion follows.

The following theorem states that $\mathfrak{S}$ with the contraction rules is refutationally complete for clauses over $\Sigma^{*}$.

Theorem 19. Let $S_{0}, S_{1}, \ldots$ be a fair theorem proving derivation w.r.t. $\mathfrak{S}$. Then $S_{0}$ is unsatisfiable if and only if the empty clause is in some $S_{j}$.

Proof. Suppose that $S_{0}, S_{1}, \ldots$ be a fair theorem proving derivation w.r.t. S. By the soundness of the derivation, if the empty clause is in some $S_{j}$, then $S_{0}$ is unsatisfiable. Otherwise, if the empty clause is not in $S_{k}$ for all $k$, then $S_{\infty}$ does not contain the empty clause by the soundness of the derivation. Applying Theorem 18, we conclude that $S_{0}$ is satisfiable.

## 6 Conditional Completion

In this section, we present a saturation procedure under $\mathfrak{S}$ for a set of conditional equations over $\Sigma^{*}$, where a conditional equation is naturally written as an equational Horn clause. A saturation procedure under $\mathfrak{S}$ can be viewed as conditional completion [12] for a set of conditional equations over $\Sigma^{*}$. If a set of conditional equations over $\Sigma^{*}$ is simply a set of equations over $\Sigma^{*}$, then the proposed saturation procedure (w.r.t. $\succ$ ) corresponds to a completion procedure for a string rewriting system. Conditional string rewriting systems were considered in [11] in the context of embedding a finitely generated monoid with decidable word problem into a monoid presented by a finite convergent conditional presentation. It neither discusses a conditional completion (or a saturation) procedure, nor considers the word problems for conditional equations over $\Sigma^{*}$ in general.

First, it is easy to see that a set of equations over $\Sigma^{*}$ is consistent. Similarly, a set of conditional equations $R$ over $\Sigma^{*}$ is consistent because each conditional equation has always a positive literal and we cannot derive the empty clause from $R$ using a saturation procedure under $\mathfrak{S}$ that is refutationally complete (cf. Section 9 in [13]). Since we only consider Horn clauses in this section, we neither need to consider the Factoring rule nor the Paramodulation rule in $\mathfrak{S}$. In the remainder of this section, by a conditional equational theory $R$, we mean a set of conditional equations $R$ over $\Sigma^{*}$.

Definition 20. Given a conditional equational theory $R$ and two finite words $s, t \in \Sigma^{*}$, a word problem w.r.t. $R$ is of the form $\phi:=s \approx$ ? $t$. The goal of this word problem is $s \not \approx t$. We say that a word problem $s \approx ? t$ w.r.t. $R$ is decidable if there is a decision procedure for determining whether $s \approx t$ is entailed by $R$ (i.e., $R \models s \approx t$ ) or not (i.e., $R \not \models s \approx t$ ).

Given a conditional equational theory $R$, let $G:=s \not \approx t$ be the goal of a word problem $s \approx ? t$ w.r.t. $R$. (Note that $G$ does not have any positive literal.) Then we see that $R \cup\{s \approx t\}$ is consistent if and only if $R \cup\{G\}$ is inconsistent. This allows one to decide a word problem w.r.t. $R$ using the equational theorem proving procedure discussed in Section 5.
Lemma 21. Let $R$ be a conditional equational theory finitely saturated under $\mathfrak{S}$. Then Rewrite together with Equality Resolution is terminating and refutationally complete for $R \cup\{G\}$, where $G$ is the goal of a word problem w.r.t. R.

Proof. Since $R$ is already saturated under $\mathfrak{S}$, inferences among Horn clauses in $R$ are redundant and remain redundant in $R \cup\{G\}$ for a theorem proving derivation starting with $R \cup\{G\}$. (Here, $\{G\}$ can be viewed as a set of support [3] for a refutation of $R \cup\{G\}$.) Now, observe that $G$ is a negative literal, so it should be selected. The only inference rules in $\mathfrak{S}$ involving a selected literal are the Rewrite and Equality Resolution rule. Furthermore, the derived literals from $G$ w.r.t. Rewrite will also be selected eventually. Therefore, it suffices to consider positive literals as the right premise (because they contain no selected literal), and $G$ and its derived literals w.r.t. Rewrite as the left premise for the Rewrite rule. Observe also that if $G^{\prime}$ is an immediate derived literal from $G$ w.r.t. Rewrite, then we see that $G \succ G^{\prime}$. If $G$ or its derived literal from $G$ w.r.t. Rewrite becomes of the form $u \not \approx u$ for some $u \in \Sigma^{*}$, then it will also be selected and an Equality Resolution inference yields the empty clause. Since $\succ$ is terminating and there are only finitely many positive literals in $R$, we may infer that the Rewrite and Equality Resolution inference steps on $G$ and its derived literals are terminating. (The number of positive literals in $R$ remains the same during a theorem proving derivation starting with $R \cup\{G\}$ using our selection strategy.)

Finally, since $\mathfrak{S}$ is refutationally complete by Thereom 19, Rewrite together with Equality Resolution is also refutationally complete for $R \cup\{G\}$.

Given a finitely saturated conditional equational theory $R$ under $\mathfrak{S}$, we provide a decision procedure for the word problems w.r.t. $R$ in the following theorem.
Theorem 22. Let $R$ be a conditional equational theory finitely saturated under $\mathfrak{S}$. Then the word problems w.r.t. R are decidable by Rewrite together with Equality Resolution.

Proof. Let $\phi:=s \approx ? t$ be a word problem w.r.t. $R$ and $G$ be the goal of $\phi$. We know that by Lemma 21, Rewrite together with Equality Resolution is terminating and refutationally complete for $R \cup\{G\}$. Let $R_{0}:=R \cup\{G\}, R_{1}, \ldots, R_{n}$ be a fair theorem proving derivation w.r.t. Rewrite together with Equality Resolution such that $R_{n}$ is the limit of this derivation. If $R_{n}$ contains the empty clause, then $R_{n}$ is inconsistent, and thus $R_{0}$ is inconsistent, i.e., $\{s \not \approx t\} \cup R$ is inconsistent by the soundness of the derivation. Since $R$ is consistent and $\{s \not \approx t\} \cup R$ is saturated under $\mathfrak{S}$, we may infer that $R \models s \approx t$.

Otherwise, if $R_{n}$ does not contain the empty clause, then $R_{n}$ is consistent, and thus $R_{0}$ is consistent by Theorem 19, i.e., $\{s \not \approx t\} \cup R$ is consistent. Since $R$ is consistent and $\{s \not \approx t\} \cup R$ is saturated under $\mathfrak{S}$, we may infer that $R \not \vDash s \approx t$.

The following corollary is a consequence of Theorem 22 and the following observation. Let $R=$ $R_{0}, R_{1}, \ldots, R_{n}$ be a finite fair theorem proving derivation w.r.t. $\mathfrak{S}$ for an initial conditional equational theory $R$ with the limit $\bar{R}:=R_{n}$. Then $R \cup\{G\}$ is inconsistent if and only if $\bar{R} \cup\{G\}$ is inconsistent by the soundness of the derivation and Theorem 19.

Corollary 23. Let $R=R_{0}, R_{1}, \ldots$ be a fair theorem proving derivation w.r.t. $\mathfrak{S}$ for a conditional equational theory $R$. If $R$ can be finitely saturated under $\mathfrak{S}$, then the word problems w.r.t. $R$ are decidable.

Example 5. Let $a \succ b \succ c$ and $R$ be a conditional equational theory consisting of the following rules 1: $a a \approx \lambda, 2: b b \approx \lambda, 3: a b \approx \lambda, 4: a b \not \approx b a \vee a c \approx c a$, and 5: $a b \not \approx b a \vee a c \not \approx c a \vee b c \approx c b$. We first saturate $R$ under $\mathfrak{S}$ :

6: $\lambda \not \approx b a \vee a c \approx c a(a b \not \approx b a$ is selected for 4. Rewrite of 4 with 3)
7: $\lambda \not \approx b a \vee a c \not \approx c a \vee b c \approx c b(a b \not \approx b a$ is selected for 5 . Rewrite of 5 with 3)
8: $a \approx b$ (Superposition of 1 with 3)
9: $\lambda \not \approx b b \vee a c \approx c a(\lambda \not \approx b a$ is selected for 6 . Rewrite of 6 with 8$)$
10: $\lambda \not \approx \lambda \vee a c \approx c a(\lambda \not \approx b b$ is selected for 9 . Rewrite of 9 with 2$)$
11: $a c \approx c a(\lambda \not \approx \lambda$ is selected for 10 . Equality Resolution on 10)
12: $\lambda \not \approx b b \vee a c \not \approx c a \vee b c \approx c b$ ( $\lambda \not \approx b a$ is selected for 7. Rewrite of 7 with 8$)$
13: $\lambda \not \approx \lambda \vee a c \not \approx c a \vee b c \approx c b$ ( $\lambda \not \approx b b$ is selected for 12 . Rewrite of 12 with 2)
14: $a c \not \approx c a \vee b c \approx c b(\lambda \not \approx \lambda$ is selected for 13. Equality Resolution on 13)
15: $c a \not \approx c a \vee b c \approx c b$ ( $a c \not \approx c a$ is selected for 14 . Rewrite of 14 with 11)
16: $b c \approx c b(c a \not \approx c a$ is selected for 15 . Equality Resolution on 15)
After some simplification steps, we have a saturated set $\bar{R}$ for $R$ under $\mathfrak{S}$ using our selection strategy (i.e., the selection of negative literals). We may infer that the positive literals in $\bar{R}$ are as follows. $1^{\prime}: b b \approx \lambda$, $2^{\prime}: a \approx b$, and $3^{\prime}: b c \approx c b$. Note that only the positive literals in $\bar{R}$ are now needed to solve a word problem w.r.t. $R$ because of our selection strategy.

Now, consider the word problem $\phi:=\operatorname{acbcba} \approx^{?}$ bccaba w.r.t. $R$, where the goal of $\phi$ is $G:=$ $a c b c b a \not \approx b c c a b a$. We only need the Rewrite and Equality Resolution steps on $G$ and its derived literals from $G$ using $1^{\prime}, 2^{\prime}$, and $3^{\prime}$. Note that all the following literals are selected except the empty clause.
$4^{\prime}: b c b c b b \not \approx b c c b b b$ (Rewrite steps of $G$ and its derived literals from $G$ using $2^{\prime}$ ).
$5^{\prime}: b c b c \not \approx b c c b$ (Rewrite steps of $4^{\prime}$ and its derived literals from $4^{\prime}$ using $1^{\prime}$ ).
$6^{\prime}: c c b b \not \approx c c b b$ (Rewrite steps of $5^{\prime}$ and its derived literals from $5^{\prime}$ using $3^{\prime}$ ).
$7^{\prime}: \square$ (Equality Resolution on $6^{\prime}$ )
Since $\bar{R} \cup G$ is inconsistent, we see that $R \cup G$ is inconsistent by the soundness of the derivation, where $R$ and $\bar{R}$ are consistent. Therefore, we may infer that $R \models a c b c b a \approx b c c a b a$.

## 7 Related Work

Equational reasoning on strings has been studied extensively in the context of string rewriting systems and Thue systems [8] and their related algebraic structures. The monotonicity assumption used in this paper is found in string rewriting systems and Thue systems in the form of a congruence relation (see $[8,17]$ ). See $[7,10,21,23]$ also for the completion of algebraic structures and decidability results using string rewriting systems, in particular cross-sections for finitely presented monoids discussed by Otto et al [23]. However, those systems are not concerned with equational theorem proving for general clauses over strings. If the monotonicity assumption is discarded, then equational theorem proving for clauses over strings can be handled by traditional superposition calculi or SMT with the theory of equality with uninterpreted functions (EUF) and their variants [6] using a simple translation into first-order
ground terms. Also, efficient SMT solvers for various string constraints were discussed in the literature (e.g., [20]).

Meanwhile, equational theorem proving modulo associativity was studied in [26]. (See also [19] for equational theorem proving with sequence variables and fixed or variadic arity symbols). This approach is not tailored towards (ground) strings, so we need an additional encoding for each string. Also, it is probably less efficient since it is not tailored towards ground strings, and it does not provide a similar decision procedure discussed in Section 6.

The proposed calculus is the first sound and refutationally complete equational theorem proving calculus for general clauses over strings under the monotonicity assumption. One may attempt to use the existing superposition calculi for clauses over strings with the proposed translation scheme, which translates clauses over strings into clauses over first-order terms discussed in Section 3.2. However, this does not work because of the Equality Factoring rule [3,22] or the Merging Paramodulation rule [3], which is essential for first-order superposition theorem proving calculi in general. For example, consider a clause $a \approx b \vee a \approx c$ with $a \succ b \succ c$, which is translated into a first-order clause $a(x) \approx b(x) \vee a(y) \approx c(y)$. The Equality Factoring rule yields $b(z) \not \approx c(z) \vee a(z) \approx c(z)$ from $a(x) \approx b(x) \vee a(y) \approx c(y)$, which cannot be translated back into a clause over strings (see Lemma 1). Similarly, a first-order clause produced by Merging Paramodulation may not be translated back into a clause over strings. If one is only concerned with refutational completeness, then the existing superposition calculi ${ }^{6}$ can be adapted by using the proposed translation scheme. In this case, a saturated set may not be translated back into clauses over strings in some cases, which is an obvious drawback for its applications (see programs in [3]).

## 8 Conclusion

This paper has presented a new refutationally complete superposition calculus with strings and provided a framework for equational theorem proving for clauses over strings. The results presented in this paper generalize the results about completion of string rewriting systems and equational theorem proving using equations over strings. The proposed superposition calculus is based on the simple string matching methods and the efficient length-lexicographic ordering that allows one to compare two finite strings in linear time for a fixed signature with its precedence.

The proposed approach translates for a clause over strings into the first-order representation of the clause by taking the monotonicity property of equations over strings into account. Then the existing notion of redundancy and model construction techniques for the equational theorem proving framework for clauses over strings has been adapted. This paper has also provided a decision procedure for word problems over strings w.r.t. a set of conditional equations $R$ over strings if $R$ can be finitely saturated under the Superposition, Rewrite and Equality Resolution rule. (The complexity analysis of the proposed approach is not discussed in this paper. It is left as a future work for this decision procedure.)

Since strings are fundamental objects in mathematics, logic, and computer science including formal language theory, developing applications based on the proposed superposition calculus with strings may be a promising future research direction. Also, the results in this paper may have potential applications in verification systems and solving satisfiability problems [1].

In addition, it would be an interesting future research direction to extend our superposition calculus with strings to superposition calculi with strings using built-in equational theories, such as commutativity, idempotency [8], nilpotency [15], and their various combinations. For example, research on superposition theorem proving for commutative monoids [25] is one such direction.

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[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Note that it suffices to assume the right monotonicity property of equations over strings, i.e., $s \approx t$ implies $s u \approx t u$ for strings $s, t$, and $u$, when finding overlaps between equations over strings under the monotonicity assumption.

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ We do not require that $u_{1} u_{2} \approx s$ (resp. $u_{2} u_{3} \approx t$ ) is strictly maximal in the left premise (resp. the right premise) because of the assumption on the monotonicity property of equations over strings (see also Lemma 1 in Section 3.2).

[^2]:    ${ }^{3}$ Note that $u_{2} \succ t$ implies that $u_{2}$ cannot be the empty string $\lambda$.

[^3]:    ${ }^{4}$ One may assume the cancellation property and associate $s \not \approx t$ over strings with $s(x) \not \approx t(x)$ over first-order terms, which is beyond the scope of this paper.

[^4]:    ${ }^{5}$ Here, an inference by Simplification combines the Deduction step for $C \vee l_{1} r l_{2} \bowtie v$ and the Deletion step for $C \vee l_{1} l l_{2} \bowtie v$ (see the Simplification rule).

[^5]:    ${ }^{6}$ The reader is also encouraged to see AVATAR modulo theories [24], which is based on the concept of splitting.

