A Stay-in-a-Set Game without a Stationary Equilibrium

Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen
(Aarhus University, Department of Computer Science) 		Mikhail Raskin
(Technical University of Munich, Department of Informatics)

We give an example of a finite-state two-player turn-based stochastic game with safety objectives for both players which has no stationary Nash equilibrium. This answers an open question of Secchi and Sudderth.

In Jérôme Leroux and Jean-Francois Raskin: Proceedings Tenth International Symposium on Games, Automata, Logics, and Formal Verification (GandALF 2019), Bordeaux, France, 2-3rd September 2019, Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 305, pp. 83–90.
Published: 18th September 2019.
ArXived at: https://dx.doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.305.6 bibtex PDF
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