Mario Benevides (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro) |
Isaque Lima (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro) |
Rafael Nader (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro) |
Pedro Rougemont (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro) |
In this paper we describe an approach to resolve strategic games in which players can assume different types along the game. Our goal is to infer which type the opponent is adopting at each moment so that we can increase the player's odds. To achieve that we use Markov games combined with hidden Markov model. We discuss a hypothetical example of a tennis game whose solution can be applied to any game with similar characteristics. |
ArXived at: https://dx.doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.144.6 | bibtex | |
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