Towards A Logical Account of Epistemic Causality

Shakil M. Khan
(Ryerson University)
Mikhail Soutchanski
(Ryerson University)

Reasoning about observed effects and their causes is important in multi-agent contexts. While there has been much work on causality from an objective standpoint, causality from the point of view of some particular agent has received much less attention. In this paper, we address this issue by incorporating an epistemic dimension to an existing formal model of causality. We define what it means for an agent to know the causes of an effect. Then using a counterexample, we prove that epistemic causality is a different notion from its objective counterpart.

In Georgiana Caltais and Jean Krivine: Proceedings of the 4th Workshop on Formal Reasoning about Causation, Responsibility, and Explanations in Science and Technology (CREST 2019), Prague, Czech Republic, 7th April 2019, Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 308, pp. 1–16.
Published: 31st October 2019.

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