

COMP 4161

NICTA Advanced Course

Advanced Topics in Software Verification

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$$\{P\}\,\dots\{Q\}$$

Slide 1

Last Time



- → Syntax of a simple imperative language
- → Operational semantics
- → Program proof on operational semantics
- → Hoare logic rules
- → Soundness of Hoare logic

Slide 2

Content **NICTA** → Intro & motivation, getting started [1] → Foundations & Principles • Lambda Calculus, natural deduction [1,2] Higher Order Logic $[3^{a}]$ Term rewriting [4] → Proof & Specification Techniques • Inductively defined sets, rule induction [5] • Datatypes, recursion, induction [6, 7] · Hoare logic, proofs about programs, C verification $[8^{b}, 9]$ (mid-semester break) • Writing Automated Proof Methods [10] • Isar, codegen, typeclasses, locales $[11^c, 12]$

a1 due; ba2 due; ca3 due

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Automation?



Last time: Hoare rule application is nicer than using operational semantic.

BUT:

- → it's still kind of tedious
- → it seems boring & mechanical

Automation?

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Invariant



Problem: While – need creativity to find right (invariant) P

Solution:

- → annotate program with invariants
- → then, Hoare rules can be applied automatically

Example:

$$\{M=0 \land N=0\}$$
 WHILE $M \neq a$ INV $\{N=M*b\}$ DO $N:=N+b; M:=M+1$ OD $\{N=a*b\}$

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Weakest Preconditions



pre
$$c$$
 Q = weakest P such that $\{P\}$ c $\{Q\}$

With annotated invariants, easy to get:

$$\begin{array}{llll} \operatorname{pre} \operatorname{SKIP} Q & = & Q \\ \operatorname{pre} \left(x := a \right) Q & = & \lambda \sigma. \ Q (\sigma (x := a \sigma)) \\ \operatorname{pre} \left(c_1 ; c_2 \right) Q & = & \operatorname{pre} c_1 \left(\operatorname{pre} c_2 Q \right) \\ \operatorname{pre} \left(\operatorname{IF} b \operatorname{THEN} c_1 \operatorname{ELSE} c_2 \right) Q & = & \lambda \sigma. \left(b \longrightarrow \operatorname{pre} c_1 Q \sigma \right) \wedge \\ & & (\neg b \longrightarrow \operatorname{pre} c_2 Q \sigma) \\ \operatorname{pre} \left(\operatorname{WHILE} b \operatorname{INV} I \operatorname{DO} c \operatorname{OD} \right) Q & = & I \end{array}$$

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Verification Conditions



$\{pre\ c\ Q\}\ c\ \{Q\}$ only true under certain conditions

These are called **verification conditions** vc c Q:

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Syntax Tricks



- $\Rightarrow x := \lambda \sigma. \ 1$ instead of x := 1 sucks
- \rightarrow $\{\lambda\sigma.\ \sigma\ x=n\}$ instead of $\{x=n\}$ sucks as well

Problem: program variables are functions, not values

Solution: distinguish program variables syntactically

Choices:

- → declare program variables with each Hoare triple
 - · nice, usual syntax
 - · works well if you state full program and only use vcg
- → separate program variables from Hoare triple (use extensible records), indicate usage as function syntactically
 - · more syntactic overhead
 - · program pieces compose nicely

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DEMO

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Arrays

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Depending on language, model arrays as functions:

→ Array access = function application:

→ Array update = function update:

Use lists to express length:

→ Array access = nth:

$$a[i] \ = \ a \, ! \, i$$

→ Array update = list update:

$$a[i] :== v = a :== a[i:= v]$$

→ Array length = list length:

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Pointers



Choice 1

 datatype
 ref
 = Ref int | Null

 types
 heap
 = int ⇒ val

 datatype
 val
 = Int int | Bool bool | Struct_x int int bool | . . .

- → hp :: heap, p :: ref
- → Pointer access: *p = the_Int (hp (the_addr p))
- → Pointer update: *p :== v = hp :== hp ((the_addr p) := v)
- → a bit klunky
- → gets even worse with structs
- → lots of value extraction (the_Int) in spec and program

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Pointers



Choice 2 (Burstall '72, Bornat '00)

struct with next pointer and element

- → next :: next_hp, elem :: elem_hp, p :: ref
- → Pointer access: p→next = next (the_addr p)
- ightharpoonup Pointer update: pightharpoonupnext :== v = next :== next ((the_addr p) := v)
- → a separate heap for each struct field
- $\Rightarrow \text{ buys you } p {\rightarrow} next \neq p {\rightarrow} elem \text{ automatically (aliasing)}$
- → still assumes type safe language

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DEMO

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We have seen today ...



- → Weakest precondition
- → Verification conditions
- → Example program proofs
- → Arrays, pointers

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