



COMP 4161
NICTA Advanced Course

Advanced Topics in Software Verification

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$\{P\} \dots \{Q\}$

Slide 1



Last Time

- Syntax of a simple imperative language
- Operational semantics
- Program proof on operational semantics
- Hoare logic rules
- Soundness of Hoare logic

Slide 2



Content

- Intro & motivation, getting started [1]
- Foundations & Principles
 - Lambda Calculus, natural deduction [1,2]
 - Higher Order Logic [3]
 - Term rewriting [4^a]
- Proof & Specification Techniques
 - Inductively defined sets, rule induction [5]
 - Datatypes, recursion, induction [6, 7]
 - Automated proof and disproof [7]
 - Hoare logic, proofs about programs, refinement [8^b,9^c,10]
 - Isar, locales [11^d,12]

^aa1 due; ^ba2 due; ^csession break; ^da3 due

Slide 3



Automation?

Last time: Hoare rule application is nicer than using operational semantic.

BUT:

- it's still kind of tedious
- it seems boring & mechanical

Automation?

Slide 4

Invariant



Problem: While – need creativity to find right (invariant) P

Solution:

- annotate program with invariants
- then, Hoare rules can be applied automatically

Example:

```
{M = 0 ∧ N = 0}
WHILE M ≠ a INV {N = M * b} DO N := N + b; M := M + 1 OD
{N = a * b}
```

Slide 5

Weakest Preconditions



pre $c Q$ = weakest P such that $\{P\} c \{Q\}$

With annotated invariants, easy to get:

```
pre SKIP Q           = Q
pre (x := a) Q       = λσ. Q(σ(x := aσ))
pre (c1; c2) Q      = pre c1 (pre c2 Q)
pre (IF b THEN c1 ELSE c2) Q = λσ. (b → pre c1 Q σ) ∧
                                   (¬b → pre c2 Q σ)
pre (WHILE b INV I DO c OD) Q = I
```

Slide 6

Verification Conditions



{pre $c Q\} c \{Q\}$ only true under certain conditions

These are called **verification conditions** $vc\ c\ Q$:

```
vc SKIP Q           = True
vc (x := a) Q       = True
vc (c1; c2) Q      = vc c2 Q ∧ (vc c1 (pre c2 Q))
vc (IF b THEN c1 ELSE c2) Q = vc c1 Q ∧ vc c2 Q
vc (WHILE b INV I DO c OD) Q = (∀σ. Iσ ∧ bσ → pre c I σ) ∧
                                   (∀σ. Iσ ∧ ¬bσ → Q σ) ∧
                                   vc c I
```

$vc\ c\ Q \wedge (P \implies \text{pre } c\ Q) \implies \{P\} c \{Q\}$

Slide 7

Syntax Tricks



- $x := \lambda\sigma. 1$ instead of $x := 1$ sucks
- $\{\lambda\sigma. \sigma\ x = n\}$ instead of $\{x = n\}$ sucks as well

Problem: program variables are functions, not values

Solution: distinguish program variables syntactically

Choices:

- declare program variables with each Hoare triple
 - nice, usual syntax
 - works well if you state full program and only use vcg
- separate program variables from Hoare triple (use extensible records), indicate usage as function syntactically
 - more syntactic overhead
 - program pieces compose nicely

Slide 8



DEMO

Slide 9

Arrays

Depending on language, model arrays as functions:

- Array access = function application:
 $a[i] = a\ i$
- Array update = function update:
 $a[i] := v = a := a[i := v]$

Use lists to express length:

- Array access = nth:
 $a[i] = a\ !\ i$
- Array update = list update:
 $a[i] := v = a := a[i := v]$
- Array length = list length:
 $a.length = length\ a$

Slide 10



Pointers

Choice 1

datatype $ref = Ref\ int\ | \ Null$
types $heap = int \Rightarrow val$
datatype $val = Int\ int\ | \ Bool\ bool\ | \ Struct_x\ int\ int\ bool\ | \dots$

- $hp :: heap, p :: ref$
- Pointer access: $*p = the_Int\ (hp\ (the_addr\ p))$
- Pointer update: $*p := v = hp := hp\ ((the_addr\ p) := v)$
- a bit klunky
- gets even worse with structs
- lots of value extraction (the_Int) in spec and program

Slide 11



Pointers

Choice 2 (Burstall '72, Bornat '00)

struct with next pointer and element

datatype $ref = Ref\ int\ | \ Null$
types $next_hp = int \Rightarrow ref$
types $elem_hp = int \Rightarrow int$

- $next :: next_hp, elem :: elem_hp, p :: ref$
- Pointer access: $p \rightarrow next = next\ (the_addr\ p)$
- Pointer update: $p \rightarrow next := v = next := next\ ((the_addr\ p) := v)$
- a separate heap for each struct field
- buys you $p \rightarrow next \neq p \rightarrow elem$ automatically (aliasing)
- still assumes type safe language

Slide 12





DEMO

Slide 13

We have seen today ...



- Weakest precondition
- Verification conditions
- Example program proofs
- Arrays, pointers

Slide 14